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THE TAX LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: A
BYRD’S EYE VIEW
ELLEN P. APRILL* AND DANIEL J. HEMEL**
I
INTRODUCTION
The year 2017 was, among other distinctions, the year of the Byrd rule. This
once-obscure Senate procedural provision—on the books since 1985 but only
recently the stuff of page one news1— featured prominently in several failed
attempts to repeal the Affordable Care Act in the spring and summer. Then again
at year’s end, the Byrd rule played a central role in the successful effort to rewrite
large swaths of the Internal Revenue Code. While the Byrd rule has influenced
the legislative process in the past, never before has it drawn so much attention
from the mainstream and trade press, and never before has it shaped so
consequential a law in such a significant way.
One theme that runs throughout this article is that when it comes to the
budget math mandated by the Byrd rule, numbers can obscure the truth. But in
other respects, numbers accurately illustrate the Byrd rule’s trajectory. Figure 1
tracks the number of articles referencing the Byrd rule in the archives of the New
York Times and the tax trade publication Tax Notes Weekly over the last three
decades. According to both metrics, interest in the Byrd rule soared to new
heights in the first year of the Trump presidency.
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1. The first reference to the Byrd rule in an article beginning on page one of the New York Times
came in March 2010, in the run-up to the passage of the Affordable Care Act. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg,
Going From Under the Radar to Under a Capitol Microscope, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2010, at A1.
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Figure 1. Articles Referencing “Byrd Rule” in New York Times and Tax
Notes Weekly, 1988-2017

The Byrd rule’s impact can be seen all throughout the new tax law, starting
from the top. It was the Byrd rule that blocked the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” from
becoming the bill’s short title. As a result, the most important tax legislation in
more than thirty years will go down in history unmelodiously as “An act to
provide for reconciliation pursuant to titles II and V of the concurrent resolution
on the budget for fiscal year 2018.” The Byrd rule also is the reason that key
elements of the new tax law—including the reduction in individual income tax
rates, the expansion of the child tax credit, the increase in the standard deduction,
the new deduction for pass-through income, and the increase in the estate and
gift tax exemption—are set to expire at the end of 2025. And the Byrd rule is the
reason why a number of provisions that appeared in earlier versions of the bill—
including a measure that would have allowed 501(c)(3) organizations to
participate in political campaigns, several significant changes to the Low Income
Housing Tax Credit, and the repeal of the tax-exempt status of professional
sports leagues—all were eliminated from the final legislation.
Some of these consequences were predictable from the outset. Even before
details of the tax bill emerged, many commentators drew attention2 to the

2. See, e.g., Jennifer Rubin, Opinion, Republicans’ Tax-Cut Myth Is About to Crumble, WASH.
POST (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2017/09/12/republicans-taxcut-myth-is-about-to-crumble/?utm_term=.e37a01f8705e
[https://perma.cc/WJQ6-QL3K];
Todd
Simmens, Will We Get Tax Reform? It’s a Matter of Debate, FORBES (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2017/09/15/will-we-get-tax-reform-its-a-matter-of-congressionaldebate/#4864dd6c64d2 [https://perma.cc/3VBK-PFP7]. For insightful discussions of this feature of the
Byrd rule, see generally Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (2011); Rebecca
M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The Political Economy of Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L.
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provision of the Byrd rule barring budget reconciliation bills that add to the
deficit beyond the budget window, which in this case was ten years.3 Informed
observers thus expected—correctly, as it turned out—that the Byrd rule would
compel Congress to phase out important elements of the bill, just as the Byrd rule
resulted in the sunset of the 2001 and 2003 Bush tax cuts.4 In other cases, even
seasoned Senators were blindsided by the Byrd rule’s ramifications. Indeed, the
Byrd rule’s little-understood requirement that every provision in a reconciliation
bill must produce revenue effects that are more than “merely incidental” to the
non-budgetary consequences caused a minor crisis in the moments leading up to
final passage of the 2017 tax legislation, with the House of Representatives
ultimately having to pass the conference report twice before leaving Washington
for the winter holiday.5
In all likelihood, this is not the last time that the Byrd rule will play a
conspicuous and consequential role in the tax legislative process. Increasing
political polarization, combined with the reality that neither party appears poised
to capture a filibuster-proof Senate majority in the foreseeable future, will lead
to greater reliance on budget reconciliation to enact tax legislation.
Congressional contentiousness—which is unlikely to abate any time soon—will
cause Senators to invoke the Byrd rule against potential violations that went
unchallenged in past reconciliation efforts. The party in power can preempt some
Byrd rule challenges by adopting a longer budget window or setting a higher
ceiling on the allowable deficit impact. Yet as long as the Byrd rule remains
binding, the rule’s restrictions will influence the procedure and substance of
federal tax law.
Some of the Byrd rule’s results are—at least arguably—quite welcome. Not
only does the Byrd rule impose a measure of fiscal discipline on Congress, but it
also stands in the way of some provisions that do little more than reward
politically well-connected special interests. Moreover, by narrowing the set of
issues that can be the subject of budget negotiations, the Byrd rule may reduce
the risk of holdup and hasten arrival at compromise. And at least as compared to
the alternative of a budget reconciliation process without any limitations as to

REV. 335 (2006); George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political Accountability, and Fiscal
Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174 (2009).
3. See H.R. Con. Res. 71, 115th Cong. (2017) (establishing the congressional budget for the U.S.
Government for fiscal year 2018 and setting forth the appropriate budgetary levels for fiscal years 2019–
2027).
4. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752 (2003);
Economic Growth & Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001); see
also Elizabeth Garrett, Accounting for the Federal Budget and Its Reform, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187,
194–98 (2004); Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 2, at 2010–21; Kysar, Sun Also Rises, supra note 2,
at 376–78, 380–82; Yin, supra note 2, at 189–92. Yin, uniquely, sees this effect of the Byrd rule as
potentially positive. See Yin, supra note 2, at 180 (“[A]doption of temporary-effect legislation increases
political accountability and may enhance fiscal restraint.”).
5. See Thomas Kaplan, House Gives Final Approval to Sweeping Tax Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/us/politics/tax-bill-republicans.html [https://perma.cc/
5CTS-TLCV].
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scope, the Byrd rule preserves a role for the minority party in the Senate,
potentially promoting a more consensus-oriented approach to lawmaking.
In other respects, the Byrd rule’s ramifications are more disconcerting. The
song and dance of setting deficit targets and then complying with those targets
through sunset provisions arguably allows lawmakers to maintain the appearance
of fiscal discipline without exercising such discipline in fact. And ironically, the
Byrd rule has stood in the way of various measures that would have imposed
further fiscal discipline on the budget reconciliation process and that would have
closed apparent loopholes. The Byrd rule’s “merely incidental” limit also
constrains Congress from enacting tax simplification measures through budget
reconciliation, and the deficit-related restrictions result in a code that is cluttered
with temporary and dormant provisions. Finally, the Byrd rule reduces the
transparency of a tax legislative process that already seems inscrutable to many
voters. To address this last problem, this article tentatively suggests several steps
that Senators, their staffs, and the Senate Parliamentarian might take to make
the Byrd rule’s operation somewhat less opaque.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of the budget
reconciliation process and explains the Byrd rule’s role in that process. Part II
examines how the Senate Parliamentarian—the nonpartisan official tasked with
interpreting most elements of the Byrd rule—has construed the rule’s provisions
in past reconciliation efforts. Part III turns toward the bill formerly known as the
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, and explains how the Byrd rule shaped Congress’s
final product. The article ends in Part IV with a reflection on the Byrd rule’s
future and evaluates the practical and normative implications of the Byrd rule’s
ever-more-prominent role.
II
BUDGET RECONCILIATION AND THE BYRD RULE IN BRIEF
Understanding the operation of the Byrd rule requires first understanding the
importance of the budget reconciliation process, and understanding the role of
budget reconciliation requires understanding the significance of the Senate’s
cloture procedure. This part begins by explaining the evolution of cloture and
then explains how that procedure relates to the Byrd rule.
For most of the Senate’s history, its members have been able to extend debate
on pending measures indefinitely—a practice known as the filibuster.6 The
filibuster is a feature that defines the character of the institution and that
6. See STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, R. XXII, S. DOC. NO. 113-18 (2013),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-113sdoc18/pdf/CDOC-113sdoc18.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2LYZ6TJV]; VALERIE HEITSCHUSEN & RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30360,
FILIBUSTERS AND CLOTURE IN THE SENATE 1 (2017); Sarah Blinder, The History of the Filibuster,
BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/the-history-of-the-filibuster/
[https://perma.cc/73XX-CWES] (testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration); Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 198 (1997);
see generally GREGORY WAWRO & ERICK SCHICKLER, FILIBUSTER: OBSTRUCTION AND LAWMAKING
IN THE U.S. SENATE (2006).
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distinguishes the Senate from other legislative bodies.7 Only for the last hundred
years have Senate rules provided for “cloture,” a maneuver that brings an end to
debate through a supermajority vote (initially two-thirds, and now sixty votes).8
Until 1974, the rule that any measure could be filibustered applied to all
legislation in the Senate, including budget bills.
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 marked a change to the rule that only
a supermajority could cut off debate in the Senate.9 With the goal of reining in
the budgetary process, Congress implemented a new budget reconciliation
procedure that allows revenue-related measures to pass the Senate without the
possibility of a filibuster. The procedure begins with the House and Senate
passing a concurrent budget resolution that gives “reconciliation instructions” to
subject-matter committees.10 These instructions generally direct subject-matter
committees to report legislation that increases or decreases revenue or outlays
by up to a specified amount over a defined budget window. For example, the
concurrent resolution for fiscal year 2018 instructed the House Ways and Means
and Senate Finance Committees to submit changes that would increase the deficit
by no more than $1.5 trillion for fiscal years 2018 through 2027.11 The House and
Senate have never set a budget window longer than ten years, though there is
nothing in the text of the Budget Act that would prohibit them from choosing a
longer period.12
Once the House and Senate agree to a concurrent resolution with
reconciliation instructions, subject-matter committees in both chambers then
report legislation that implements those instructions. Each chamber then
considers the legislation produced by its committees.13 If the House and Senate
pass bills that are not identical, a committee of lawmakers works out a conference
report that must be approved again in identical form by each chamber and

7. Gregory J. Wawro & Eric Schickler, Legislative Obstructionism, 13 ANN. REV. POLIT. SCI. 297,
297 (2010).
8. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, supra note 6, at 15–17 (2013); FLOYD M. RIDDICK, & ALAN
S. FRUMIN, RIDDICK’S SENATE PROCEDURE: PRECEDENTS AND PRACTICES, S. DOC. 101-28, at 282–
334 (Alan S. Frumin ed., 1992).
9. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297
(codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 601–88 (1990)); see generally MEGAN S. LYNCH & JAMES V. SATURNO, CONG.
RESEARCH SERVICE, R44058, THE BUDGET RECONCILIATION PROCESS: STATES OF CONSIDERATION
(2017).
10. See U.S. Senate Glossary, Budget Resolution, SENATE.GOV, http://www.senate.gov/reference/
glossary_term/budget_resolution.htm [https://perma.cc/63SQ-HX49] (last visited Apr. 12, 2018).
11. H.R. Con. Res. 71, 115th Cong. (2017).
12. Dylan F. Moroses & Stephen K. Cooper, Questions Raised on Budget Window Extension for
Tax Reform, TAX ANALYSTS (May 13, 2017), http://www.taxanalysts.org/content/questions-raisedbudget-window-extension-tax-reform [https://perma.cc/7A8T-QCET]; Brian Riedl, Extend Budget
Resolution for Tax Reform and Fiscal Responsibility, MANHATTAN INST. (June 22, 2017),
http://economics21.org/html/extend-budget-resolution-window-tax-reform-and-fiscal-responsibility2410.html [https://perma.cc/QU6Z-LBB3].
13. See U.S. Senate Glossary, Reconciliation Bill, SENATE.GOV, http://www.senate.gov/reference/
glossary_term/reconciliation_bill.htm [https://perma.cc/ZWW8-WBNV] (last visited Mar. 26, 2018).
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presented to the President for signature or veto.14
The availability of this new fast-track process threatened to undermine the
Senate’s supermajoritarian norms by allowing a simple majority to enact
measures via reconciliation that had little relation to the federal budget. To
protect the reconciliation process from abuse, Democratic Senator Robert Byrd
of West Virginia introduced the rule that now bears his name. In introducing the
provision in October 1985, Senator Byrd explained:
Mr. President, the amendment speaks for itself. I would just say that we are in the
process now of seeing, if we have not seen earlier, the Pandora’s box which has been
opened to the abuse of the reconciliation process. That process was never meant to be
used as it is being used.
...
Mr. President, the Senate is a deliberative body, and the reconciliation process is not a
deliberative process. It [is] not a deliberative process. Such an extraordinary process, if
abused, could destroy the Senate’s deliberative nature . . .15

The Senate adopted the Byrd rule unanimously, 96-0.16
Although it was initially a temporary measure,17 Congress made the Byrd rule
permanent and codified it in 1990.18 In its present form, the Byrd rule applies to
legislation at each stage of the budget reconciliation process: to budget
resolutions with reconciliation instructions, to reconciliation bills, and to
conference reports that emerge when each chamber passes separate
reconciliation legislation.19 Whenever the Senate is considering any of these
“measures, any Senator can raise a point of order20 asserting that the legislation
includes a provision that is “extraneous.” The Byrd rule defines a provision as
“extraneous” if it:
(A) does not produce a change in outlays or revenues;
(B) produces an increase in outlays or decrease in revenues that does not follow the
reconciliation instructions in the budget resolution;
(C) is not in the jurisdiction of the committee that reported the provision;
(D) produces changes in outlays or revenues that are merely incidental to the nonbudgetary components of the provision;
(E) increases the deficit in any fiscal year after the period specified in the budget
resolution (i.e., the “budget window”); or

14. See U.S. Senate Glossary, Conference Report, SENATE.GOV, http://www.senate.gov/reference/
glossary_term/conference_report.htm [https://perma.cc/6WAR-DNEB] (last visited Mar. 26, 2018).
15. WILLIAM G. DAUSTER, BUDGET PROCESS LAW ANNOTATED 231–32 n.616 (1993) (quoting 131
CONG. REC. S14,032-37 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1985)).
16. Id. at 237 (quoting 131 CONG. REC. S14,038). Senators Eagleton, Hatfield, Simon, and Stennis
were absent. Id.
17. See BILL HENIFF, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30862, THE BUDGET RECONCILIATION
PROCESS: THE SENATE’S “BYRD RULE” 1–2 (2016).
18. 2 U.S.C. § 644 (2012).
19. See id. § 644(a), (d).
20. See U.S. Senate Glossary, Point of Order, Senate.gov, http://www.senate.gov/reference/
glossary_term/point_of_order.htm [https://perma.cc/K8YR-A26L] (last visited Mar. 26, 2018).
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(F) recommends changes to Social Security.21

The Byrd rule is not self-executing: a provision will be stricken from a
reconciliation bill only if it is challenged on grounds that it is extraneous. And
once a provision has been challenged on the grounds that it is extraneous, the
Presiding Officer22 of the Senate—who is either the Vice President or a majority
party member selected by the Senate’s President pro tempore—must decide
whether to sustain or overrule the point of order.23 If the Presiding Officer
sustains the point of order (in other words, agrees that the provision is
extraneous), the provision is stricken from the legislation24 unless sixty Senators
vote to waive the Byrd rule or override the Presiding Officer.25 Likewise, if the
Presiding Officer rejects the point of order, sixty Senators can overcome that
ruling to strike the provision.26
In practice, the Presiding Officer rarely rules on a Byrd rule point of order
before consulting one of two individuals: the Senate Budget Committee Chair or
the Senate Parliamentarian.27 The Senate Budget Committee Chair advises the
Presiding Officer with respect to Byrd rule challenges made under subparagraphs
(B) and (E): whether the revenue effects conform to the concurrent resolution’s
reconciliation instructions and whether the bill increases the deficit beyond the
budget window. As a matter of practice, the Senate Budget Committee Chair
defers to revenue estimates produced by the Staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation (JCT) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) with respect to
these types of Byrd Rule challenges.28 Former Senate Finance Committee Chair
Bob Dole reportedly said that the entire process “made him feel like the chair of
a subcommittee of the Budget Committee, rather than chair of the usually
powerful Finance Committee.”29
21. See § 644(b)(1).
22. See U.S. Senate Glossary, Presiding Officer, SENATE.GOV, http://www.senate.gov/reference/
glossary_term/presiding_officer.htm [https://perma.cc/9PSM-9C72] (last visited Mar. 26, 2018).
23. § 644(e); see also Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax
Legislative Processes, 43 B.C. L. REV. 863, 882 (2002) (“The meaning of ‘extraneous’ can be complex,
ambiguous, and often depends on controversial rulings from the Chair.”).
24. 2 U.S.C. § 644(a), (e) (2012).
25. HENIFF, JR., supra note 17, at 4.
26. Id.
27. See RIDDICK & FRUMIN, supra note 8, at 505; IDA A. BRUDNICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R43532, OFFICES AND OFFICIALS IN THE SENATE: ROLES AND DUTIES (2015); VALERIE HEITSHUSEN,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20544, THE OFFICE OF THE PARLIAMENTARIAN IN THE HOUSE AND
SENATE (2017). Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott fired Parliamentarian Robert Dove rather than
ignoring his rulings. See infra text accompanying notes 82–85.
28. See BILL HENIFF, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-560, BASELINES AND SCOREKEEPING IN
THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 1–2 (2012); JAMES V. SATURNO ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98721, INTRODUCTION TO THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS 8 (2012); CONG. BUDGET OFF., AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE FEDERAL BUDGET OFFICE (2016), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/
files/cbofiles/attachments/2016-IntroToCBO.pdf [https://perma.cc/PNS4-MN9F]; About Us, STAFF OF J.
COMM. ON TAX’N, http://www.jct.gov/about-us/statutory-basis.html [https://perma.cc/72R3-GUXB] (last
visited Mar. 11, 2018).
29. George K. Yin, The Evolving Legislative Process: Implications for Tax Reform, 114 TAX NOTES
313, 316–17 (2007) (quoting JOHN B. GILMOUR, RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCE? CONGRESS, THE
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To illustrate: if a Senator raised a point of order objecting to the recent tax
law on the grounds that it adds more than $1.5 trillion to the deficit over the 2018–
2027 budget window, the Presiding Officer would presumably defer to the Senate
Budget Committee Chair’s judgment as to whether the point of order should be
sustained. The Senate Budget Committee Chair would then consult the JCT staff
and the CBO. Likewise, if a Senator raised a point of order claiming that the
reconciliation bill adds to the deficit beyond the budget window, the Senate
Budget Committee Chair would likely resolve that dispute based on the JCT and
CBO projections.
To be sure, there is no statute requiring that the Senate Budget Committee
Chair yield to the JCT and CBO estimates. Thus, the Presiding Officer’s
deference to the Senate Budget Committee Chair in instances of Byrd rule
challenges vests the Budget Committee Chair with considerable power.30
However, the Senate Budget Committee Chair’s power to override JCT and
CBO estimates has long remained latent.31
In contrast to the Senate Budget Committee Chair’s role in adjudicating Byrd
rule challenges under subparagraphs (B) and (E), it is the Senate Parliamentarian
who generally calls the shots with respect to challenges raised under the Byrd
rule’s other provisions. The Senate Parliamentarian is a nonpartisan official who
serves as the official adviser to the Senate on the interpretation of the body’s
rules and procedures.32 With very few exceptions,33 the Presiding Officer follows
the Parliamentarian’s recommendations on matters of procedure, and no reports
indicate that the Presiding Officer has ever rejected the Parliamentarian’s advice
with respect to a Byrd rule point of order.

BUDGET PROCESS AND THE DEFICIT 148 (1990)).
30. See Daniel Hemel & David Herzig, The Art of the (Budget) Deal, YALE J. ON REG. (Dec. 2,
2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/the-art-of-the-budget-deal-by-daniel-hemel-and-david-herzig [https://
perma.cc/6RAN-TGGC].
31. The idea of exercising this power more robustly had been floated by some commentators in the
lead-up to the recent tax reform. See Tara Golshan, The Republican Tax Reform Bill Will Live and Die
By This Obscure Senate Rule, VOX (Nov. 14, 2017), http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/
11/14/16634200/republican-tax-reform-byrd-rule [https://perma.cc/4FRM-NY5H] (“The Senate Budget
Committee could also use a different, more ideologically conservative score of their tax plan instead of
the CBO’s evaluation.”). Despite criticism from some Republican Senators that the JCT’s economic
growth projections were too low, the Senate still used its scores when crafting the recent tax reform
legislation. See Senate Republicans Scramble to Find Revenue for Tax Bill with Vote Expected Friday,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/30/us/politics/tax-overhaul-senatedebate.html [https://perma.cc/8LVS-KQR9].
32. See U.S. Senate Glossary, Parliamentarian, SENATE.GOV, http://www.senate.gov/reference/
glossary_term/parliamentarian.html [https://perma.cc/ZV66-VKU6] (last visited Mar. 26, 2018); U.S.
H.R. COMM. ON RULES, SUMMARY OF THE BYRD RULE, http://archives-democrats-rules.house.gov/
archives/byrd_rule.htm [http://perma.cc/9XYU-6UY9] (archived) (last visited Mar. 11, 2018).
33. One such instance was in February 1987, when then-Vice President George H.W. Bush exercised
this power during a now-forgotten fight over energy efficiency standards. See Bernard Weinraub,
Appliances, Rules and Politics Have Senators in an Uproar, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 1987),
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/02/06/us/appliances-rules-and-politics-have-senators-in-an-uproar.html
[https://perma.cc/SEM5-CDUK].
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While points of order are raised and decided in public view,34 the
Parliamentarian exerts her influence over the interpretation of the Byrd rule
largely behind closed doors. In a so-called “Byrd bath,”35 representatives from
the majority and minority parties in the Senate (usually Budget and Finance
Committee staffers, but occasionally others) will meet with the Parliamentarian
and debate which provisions violate the Byrd rule’s strictures. Sponsors generally
remove such provisions36 before the bill goes to a final vote. (Continuing with the
avian theme, staffers sometimes refer to such provisions as “Byrd droppings.”37)
As a result, the handful of cases in which the Presiding Officer has ruled on
whether a provision violates the Byrd rule’s strictures represent just a small share
of the total number of instances in which material has been stripped from
legislation on the advice of the Parliamentarian.38
Of all the Byrd rule’s elements, it is subparagraph (E)—the prohibition on
provisions that “produce[] changes in outlays or revenues that are merely
incidental to the non-budgetary consequences”—that adds most to the opacity of
the Byrd bath process. It is, in jurisprudential terms, a “standard” rather than a
“rule,”39 and it is an especially amorphous standard at that. An annotated edition
of the federal budget laws produced by the Senate Budget Committee in 1993 so
concedes:
This subparagraph contributes much of the ambiguity created by [the Byrd rule]. Its
language calls for the exercise of judgment. The Parliamentarian has not laid down any
bright-line test to aid that judgment, and reserves the right to consider each individual
case on its merits.
The drafters of this subparagraph wished to prohibit provisions in which policy changes
plainly overwhelmed deficit changes. For example, a nationwide abortion prohibition
might marginally reduce Government spending, but would constitute a much more
significant policy change than budgetary action. The application of this subparagraph,
however, has ranged wider than such plain cases.40

34. See 2 U.S.C. § 644(e) (2012).
35. See ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 149 (3d
ed. 2007); Margot Sanger-Katz, Byrd Bath: Seven Provisions That Could Disappear from the Senate
Health Bill, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/upshot/byrd-bath-sevenprovisions-that-could-disappear-from-the-senate-health-bill.html [https://perma.cc/9KXD-TYT8].
36. See Yin, supra note 2, at 216; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Parliamentarian in Role as Health Bill Referee,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/14/us/politics/14rules.html [https://
perma.cc/M9AY-6PB9].
37. See Yin, supra note 2, at 216; Stolberg, supra note 36.
38. See HENIFF, JR., supra note 17, at 20–32, tbl.4.
39. One prominent scholar frames the distinction as follows:
The general debate over legal form in jurisprudence and private law characterizes rule-like
directives as affording less discretion than standards. . . . A legal directive is “rule”-like when it
binds a decisionmaker to respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering
facts. . . . A legal directive is “standard”-like when it tends to collapse decisionmaking back into
the direct application of the background principle or policy to a fact situation. Standards . . .
giv[e] the decisionmaker more discretion than do rules.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards,
106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 26, 58 (1992) (footnote omitted).
40. DAUSTER, supra note 15, at 208 n.580.
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The abortion example illustrates a point that the annotation goes on to state
explicitly: “Budgetary effect, without more, does not insulate a provision from
violating the [‘merely incidental’ condition].”41 At the same time, “[p]rovisions
that have budgetary effects that the Congressional Budget Office cannot estimate
do not necessarily violate” the Byrd rule.42 It is thus clear that the “merely
incidental” proviso does not come down to a single number. What is less clear is
which features of a challenged provision lead the Parliamentarian to conclude
that it runs afoul of subparagraph (E).
III
THE BYRD RULE IN OPERATION
The Byrd rule’s history can be divided into five eras: (1) an early period of
relative quietude; (2) a brief interval from 1993 to 1994 in which Democrats used
budget reconciliation to enact important elements of President Clinton’s
domestic policy agenda; (3) a longer stretch from 1995 until the end of the Clinton
presidency when a Republican-controlled Congress used budget reconciliation to
pursue its legislative goals; (4) a period in the early twenty-first century when
budget reconciliation was used primarily to pass tax cuts and the Byrd rule’s
primary effect was to force the inclusion of sunset provisions; and (5) the current
period of Byrd rule battles that have shaped all aspects of the most important
legislation in recent years. This part traces the Byrd rule through those five eras
in an attempt to understand how it has come to play the role that it now does.
A. The Early Years
From the time of the Byrd rule’s introduction until 1993, the Senate used the
budget reconciliation process primarily to enact legislation with supermajority or
bipartisan support. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts of 1986,43 1987,44
and 198945 all garnered more than sixty votes. The Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 199046 passed by a narrower margin—only fifty-four
votes—but those yeas included thirty-seven Democrats and seventeen
Republicans, including both the majority and minority leaders.47
Perhaps due to the relative amity of the Senate in those years, the Byrd rule’s
early life was a quiet one. This is not to say, however, that Byrd rule issues were
entirely absent from the budget reconciliation process in the late 1980s and early

41. Id. at 509.
42. Id.
43. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, H.R. 5300, 99th Cong. (1986).
44. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, H.R. 3545, 100th Cong. (1987).
45. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, H.R. 3299, 101st Cong. (1989).
46. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, H.R. 5835, 101st Cong. (1990).
47. See U.S. Senate Roll Call Vote 101st Congress – 2nd Session, SENATE.GOV, http://www.senate.
gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=101&session=2&vote=00326#positio
n [https://perma.cc/28G7-9AYQ] (last visited Mar. 1, 2018) (on H.R. 5835). No budget reconciliation bills
were passed in 1988, 1991, or 1992. See HENIFF, JR., supra note 17, tbl.4.
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1990s. For example, during consideration of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1990, Democratic Senator Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio raised a point of
order to strike two provisions imposing criminal penalties for violations of
workplace safety laws. Senator Metzenbaum did not object to the provisions on
substantive grounds—in fact, he had supported them in the Labor Committee. In
explaining his point of order, Senator Metzenbaum said:
We consulted with the Budget Committee experts before including the OSHA criminal
penalty provisions in the reconciliation package. Based on the revenue estimate by the
Congressional Budget Office, those experts indicated that the criminal penalty
provisions were not extraneous under the Byrd rule. But I understand this may be a
close question. I want to support the leaders in their effort to keep extraneous provisions
out of this package; therefore I am willing to put the question to the Chair and to abide
by the Chair’s ruling.48

The Chair (that is, Presiding Officer), at the Parliamentarian’s recommendation,
sustained the point of order and struck the criminal penalty provisions from the
final bill.
One of the few contentious Byrd rule debates during these early years
concerned a provision in the 1990 Act that directed the Secretary of
Transportation to develop a “National Aviation Noise Policy.”49 The provision
drew strong opposition from Senators who were concerned that the new policy
would preempt local noise controls.50 Democratic Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan of New York described it as “an atrocious measure to be on a budget
reconciliation bill.”51 His Republican colleague from New York, Alfonse
D’Amato, agreed, and raised a point of order on the ground that the noise policy
produced no change in outlays or revenues.52 The Parliamentarian evidently
concurred in D’Amato’s assessment, but the Senate voted 69–31 to waive the
Byrd rule so that the provision could remain in the bill. Incidentally, Senator Byrd
was one of the Senators who voted in favor of waiving his namesake rule.53
B. 1993 as a Turning Point
The 103rd Congress, from 1993 to 1994, was a turning point in the life of the
Byrd rule. In 1993, for the first time since the rule’s introduction, both houses of
Congress and the presidency were under the unified control of a single party. Bill
Clinton began his first term with a 259–175 Democratic majority in the House,
and a 57–43 majority in the Senate.54 Thus, a united Republican minority could
block legislation subject to the filibuster in the Senate but could not stop
reconciliation bills. This new configuration came at a time of increasing

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See 136 CONG. REC. S15,771 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1990).
See 136 CONG. REC. S15,777 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1990).
See, e.g., id. (statement of Sen. Durenberger).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See KENNETH E. COLLIER, BETWEEN THE BRANCHES: THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS 290, app. B (1997).
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ideological polarization between the parties.55
At one point in the 103rd Congress, President Clinton and Senate Majority
Leader George Mitchell considered using the budget reconciliation process to
pass a sweeping health care reform package. Senator Byrd, protective of the
institution’s supermajoritarian norms, apparently nixed that idea along with a
handful of other Democrats who thought that using budget reconciliation for
health care reform would be, in the words of North Dakota Democrat Kent
Conrad, an “abuse of the process” that was “not what the Founding Fathers
intended for this body.”56 Even so, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993 was distinctively contentious and partisan, with a number of provisions that
pushed the Byrd rule’s boundaries. While health care reform was left out, the
final bill implemented important elements of the Clinton administration
domestic policy agenda, including an expansion of the earned income tax credit,
the creation of “empowerment zones” and “enterprise communities,” and the
extension of Food Stamps to new beneficiaries.57 The package passed without a
single Republican Senator’s support, and with Vice President Al Gore casting the
deciding vote.
A couple of additional examples offer a taste of the Byrd rule debates during
the 1993 budget fight. One involved a provision requiring childhood vaccine
manufacturers who sold vaccines to the federal Centers for Disease Control to
offer similar terms to states. During the debate over the Senate’s initial
reconciliation bill, Republican Senator Bob Packwood of Oregon challenged that
provision on Byrd rule grounds, and the Presiding Officer—apparently on the
Parliamentarian’s recommendation—agreed that it was extraneous, evidently
because the provision primarily affected state, rather than federal, budgets.58
However, the Congressional Budget Office later said that allowing states to buy
vaccines at the CDC price would have some effect on the price that the federal
government paid, even though it could not quantify the effect.59 When a similar
provision appeared in the conference report, Republican Senator John Danforth
of Missouri challenged it. This time, however, the Presiding Officer—apparently
again on the Parliamentarian’s recommendation—overruled the point of order
and allowed the provision to remain in the final bill.60
Another controversial provision in the 1993 bill imposed an assessment on
cigarette manufacturers importing more than twenty-five percent of the tobacco
they used. The assessment was set at a rate that would make it unprofitable for
manufacturers to trigger it. It also caused the United States to violate
55. See Brian D. Feinstein & Daniel J. Hemel, Partisan Balance with Bite, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 9,
25–29 (2018).
56. 147 CONG. REC. S3,263 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2001) (statement of Senator Conrad) (describing his
reaction several years later).
57. DAUSTER, supra note 15, at 209.
58. Id. at 207 n.575 (citing 139 CONG. REC. S7,926, S7,928 (daily ed. June 24, 1993)).
59. 139 CONG. REC. S10,665, ex.1 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1993).
60. DAUSTER, supra note 15, at 210–12, n.580 (quoting 139 CONG. REC. S10,659–61 (daily ed. Aug.
6, 1993)).
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international trade laws (as the World Trade Organization would later rule). The
Congressional Budget Office estimated that the assessment would raise only $6
million a year, and Republican Senator Hank Brown of Colorado raised a Byrd
rule challenge.61 On the Parliamentarian’s recommendation, however, the
Presiding Officer ruled that the provision’s budgetary effects were more than
“merely incidental” to the non-budgetary consequences. 62
C. The Byrd Rule under Divided Government
Partisan fights over the Byrd rule continued after the November 1994 midterm elections, when Republicans gained control of both houses of Congress for
the first time in forty years. During the debate over the Republican-backed
Balanced Budget Act of 1995, then-Parliamentarian Robert Dove ruled that a
provision that would have barred the use of federal funds for abortion violated
the Byrd rule’s “merely incidental” proviso because, as Dove later explained, it
“was not there to save money but to implement a huge social policy.”63 The
Senate ultimately passed the bill without the abortion provision, although
President Clinton’s veto prevented the bill from becoming law.
The Byrd rule also played a role in shaping the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Act of 1996, the bipartisan bill that fulfilled President
Clinton’s promise to end “welfare as we know it.”64 The final bill passed the
Senate by a 78–21 margin, making the resort to reconciliation unnecessary as a
maneuver to circumvent the filibuster.65 Nonetheless, the Byrd rule shaped the
legislation’s content in a number of ways. In July 1996, Democratic Senator
James Exon of Nebraska raised Byrd rule points of order against several
controversial elements of the law.66 His points of order included a provision that
would have prevented mothers who had children while on welfare from receiving
additional benefits,67 a measure that would have set aside $75 million from the
Maternal and Child Health Block Grant Program to fund abstinence education,
and a provision that would have allowed states to contract with charitable,
religious, and private organizations to administer block grant-funded services.
Republican Senator Pete Domenici of New Mexico moved to waive all three
61. 139 CONG. REC. S10,675–77 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1993).
62. Id.
63. Gail Russell Chaddock, Who’s Al Frumin and Why Might He Shape US Health Reform?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 14, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2009/1014/whosalan-frumin-and-why-might-he-shape-us-health-reform [https://perma.cc/YY28-P9QP] (quoting Robert
Dove).
64. See Pam Fessler, Welfare “As We Know It” Ended in 1996. Did It Help or Hurt?, NPR (Aug. 21,
2016),
http://www.npr.org/2016/08/21/490852973/20-years-since-welfare-reform-what-are-its-lastingeffects [https://perma.cc/L5DQ-KP3N].
65. See Personal Responsibility and Budget Reconciliation Act of 1996, H.R. 3734, 104th Cong.
(1996).
66. For the debate over the Exon points of order, see 142 CONG. REC. S8,501–32 (daily ed. July 23,
1996).
67. This measure evidently would not have affected federal revenues or outlays because it did not
alter the size of any state’s block grants.
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points of order. His motion failed with respect to the family cap provision by a
42–57 vote68 and failed with respect to the abstinence education measure by a 52–
46 margin.69 His motion succeeded, however, with respect to the contracting
provision: the Senate voted 67–32 to keep that provision in the final bill,
notwithstanding the apparent Byrd rule violation.70
The debate over the abstinence education measure illustrates the extent to
which the Byrd rule’s application depends critically on the definition of the word
“provision.” Recall that the Byrd rule applies on a provision-by-provision basis:
“a provision of a reconciliation bill . . . shall be considered extraneous if such
provision does not produce a change in outlays or revenues . . . [or] produces
changes in outlays or revenues which are merely incidental to the non-budgetary
components of the provision.”71 Setting aside $75 million in Maternal and Child
Health Services Block Grant money for abstinence education does not produce
a change in outlays, but if the measure is construed as containing two
provisions—one that increases spending on abstinence education by $75 million
and one that cuts $75 million from the block grant—then each provision produces
a change in outlays. As later developments demonstrate, however, the manner in
which the Parliamentarian defines “provision” appears to be less than consistent.
Two more episodes from the Clinton years deserve attention because of what
they teach us about the Byrd rule’s potential unintended consequences. The first
involved a proposal in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 to raise the Medicare
eligibility age incrementally from sixty-five to sixty-seven over the course of a
twenty-four year period, from 2003 to 2027. Democratic Senator Richard Durbin
of Illinois raised a point of order on the grounds that the provision “produces no
change in outlays or revenues during the required period of time”—in that case,
the 1998–2003 period covered by the budget resolution.72 The Parliamentarian
apparently agreed and advised the Presiding Officer that the eligibility age
provision did indeed violate the Byrd rule.73
Republican Senator William Roth of Delaware, a supporter of the provision,
responded:
[It was] very ironic that a point of order was made on this matter, because while it is
true that it will not have a significant impact on revenue in the early years because of
the very, very compassionate way we are introducing changing the age of eligibility, the
fact is that this very modest approach will do a very, very great deal in the long term in
helping the solvency of this program.74

68. 142 CONG. REC. S8,507 (daily ed. July 23, 1996).
69. Id. at S8,509.
70. Id. at S8,508.
71. 2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1)(A), (D) (2012) (emphases added).
72. 143 CONG. REC. S6,092 (daily ed. June 23, 1997).
73. The Parliamentarian’s rationale is certainly open to question. The relevant subparagraph of the
Byrd rule states that “a provision of a reconciliation bill . . . shall be considered extraneous if such
provision does not produce a change in outlays or revenues,” 2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1)(A), but it does not say
that the change in outlays or revenues must fall within the window set by the budget resolution. See id.
74. 143 CONG. REC. S6,117 (daily ed. June 24, 1997).
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Republican Senator Phil Gramm of Texas, another supporter of the provision,
called it “the ultimate paradox” that the Byrd rule could be used to scuttle a
measure aimed at saving Medicare from insolvency.75
Ultimately, the Byrd rule was not what prevented Congress from raising the
Medicare eligibility age. The Senate voted 62–38 to waive the point of order, with
twelve Democrats joining fifty Republicans in support of waiver.76 But Senators
could not convince House Republicans to back the change, and the provision was
dropped in conference.77 Still, the Medicare eligibility episode seems surprising
in hindsight. On its face, the Byrd rule simply requires each provision to “produce
a change in outlays or revenues;” it does not require the outlay or revenue change
to occur within the budget window. And looking beyond the Byrd rule’s text to
its purpose, the idea that the Byrd rule would stand as an obstacle to legislation
that dramatically reduces the long-term deficit seems to turn the Byrd rule on its
head.
The second episode involved the fate of balanced budget enforcement
measures in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. During the Senate’s debate over
that legislation, Republican Senator Sam Brownback of Kansas and Democrat
Herb Kohl of Wisconsin introduced an amendment that would have set target
levels for direct spending from fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002. If direct
spending (such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid) exceeded those
targets, then Senate consideration of a budget resolution would be out of order
unless the resolution fully addressed the overage.78 Democratic Senator Frank
Lautenberg of New Jersey, who opposed the amendment, raised a point of order
on the grounds that the amendment violated the Byrd rule—evidently because it
would not produce a change in outlays or revenues if direct spending remained
below target levels. A waiver motion failed on a 57–43 vote (with four Democrats
joining all fifty-three Republicans in support), and the amendment fell out of the
final bill.79 Immediately afterwards, Republican Senator Bill Frist of Tennessee
introduced an amendment that would have set a sixty-vote threshold for any
deficit-increasing legislation starting in fiscal year 2002 and would have required
the President to submit a balanced budget to Congress starting in 2002.80 Again,
Senator Lautenberg raised a point of order on the grounds that the amendment
would not produce a change in outlays or revenues. This time, the waiver motion
fell one vote short of the sixty-vote threshold, with six Democrats joining fifty-

75. Id. at S6,118.
76. See Eric Pianin, Senate Votes To Raise Medicare Eligibility Wage, WASH. POST (June 25, 1997),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1997/06/25/senate-votes-to-raise-medicare-eligibilityage/aa2f8985-566a-44fc-a130-eb222e0af60d [https://perma.cc/6BY8-GZ4R].
77. See Eric Pianin, Medicare Eligibility-Age Rise Rejected, WASH. POST (July 11, 1997),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/medicare/stories/med071197.htm
[https://perma.cc/FMS6-FGU6].
78. 143 CONG. REC. S6,676 (daily ed. June 27, 1997).
79. Id. at S6,677.
80. Id.
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three Republicans in support.81
The failure of the Frist amendment set the stage for the reconciliation bills
that would follow in the early years of the Bush administration. If Frist’s
amendment had become and remained law, the deficit-increasing Bush tax cuts
of 2001 and 2003 could not have been enacted through budget reconciliation. In
this respect, the use of budget reconciliation for deficit-increasing legislation in
the Bush years followed directly from the Parliamentarian’s earlier formalism.
D. The Byrd Rule Enters the Twenty-First Century
The next major front in the fight over the Byrd rule concerned the use of
budget reconciliation to enact deficit-increasing tax cuts. The 107th Congress
began in 2001 with Republicans holding the Presidency, the House of
Representatives, and the slimmest of Senate majorities—fifty seats plus Vice
President Dick Cheney as the tie-breaking vote. Republicans sought to use
budget reconciliation to slash taxes, prompting objections from Democratic
Senators who believed that budget reconciliation should be used for deficitreducing—not deficit-increasing—legislation. But neither the text of the Byrd
rule nor the other provisions of the Budget Act explicitly prohibit Senators from
using budget reconciliation to pass legislation that increases the deficit during the
budget window, and then-Senate Parliamentarian Robert Dove ruled in early
2001 that budget reconciliation could indeed be used to enact deficit-increasing
tax cuts.82
Dove’s ruling reportedly “delighted Republicans and infuriated
Democrats.”83 But the Republican majority’s satisfaction with Dove would not
last much longer. Dove interpreted the Budget Act to allow for only one taxrelated reconciliation bill per year, and he also opined that a measure to set aside
$5 billion for natural disasters would violate the Byrd rule on the grounds that
the set-aside would not produce a change in revenues or outlays if the funds went
unused.84 Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott responded by instructing the
Secretary of the Senate to dismiss Dove. The Secretary of the Senate promptly
did so.85

81. Id. at S6,678.
82. See David E. Rosenbaum, Rules Keeper Is Dismissed by Senate, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (May
8, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/08/us/rules-keeper-is-dismissed-by-senate-official-says.html
[https://perma.cc/F3YC-U5DN].
83. Id.
84. See SCHICK, supra note 35, at 148–49; Charles Tiefer, Firing Parliamentarian—What Rules?,
DAILY REP. (Fulton Cty., Ga.), May 18, 2001, at 1.
85. See SCHICK, supra note 35, at 148–49 (Box 6-2); Nick Anderson & Janet Hook, Lott to Oust
Senate Parliamentarian Who Ruled Against GOP, L.A. TIMES (May 8, 2001), http://articles.latimes.com/
2001/may/08/news/mn-60735 [https://perma.cc/R9CE-JXYM]; Helen Dewar, Key Senate Official Loses
Job in Dispute With GOP, WASH. POST (May 8, 2001), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
archive/politics/2001/05/08/key-senate-official-loses-job-in-dispute-with-gop/e2310021-0f14-4667-a26154e6c033207c/?utm_term=.b3d6e359c76d [https://perma.cc/FB7B-UMC8]; Rosenbaum, supra note 82.

APRILL_HEMEL_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2 2018]

5/16/2018 4:54 PM

THE TAX LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: A BYRD’S EYE VIEW

115

The Senate then went ahead and passed the Economic Growth and Tax
Reconciliation Act of 2001, which slashed taxes by an estimated $1.35 trillion
over a decade.86 The Byrd rule required (or had the effect of requiring) the
Republicans to add several sunset provisions to the legislation, with some of the
bill’s tax cuts expiring in 2008 and 2010. These sunset provisions ensured that the
bill would not add to the deficit beyond the ten-year budget window established
by the applicable budget resolution. Subsequent tax bills under President Bush
in 200387 and 2006 also included such sunsets.88
While the Senate passed five budget reconciliation bills during the Bush
years, the 2001–2009 period saw relatively little Byrd rule-related activity on the
Senate floor. Two episodes, however, deserve brief mention. The first involved
the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, which included several significant changes to
Medicare, Medicaid, and student loan formulas. In December 2005, negotiators
from the House and Senate hashed out a conference report that then went back
to both chambers for final approval. The House passed the conference report by
a 212–206 margin on December 19, 2005, after which House members left
Washington for a holiday recess.89 Senator Kent Conrad then raised a point of
order against several provisions in the conference report, including one that
would have affected medical malpractice suits brought by Medicare beneficiaries.
Under that provision, Medicaid patients could recover for medical malpractice
only by showing that defendant hospitals and physicians flunked a “gross
negligence” (rather than “negligence”) standard. Senator Conrad argued—and
the Parliamentarian evidently agreed—that the budgetary effects of this
provision were “merely incidental” to the non-budgetary consequences.90 A
motion to waive the point of order garnered fifty-two votes—well short of the
sixty votes needed—and the provision fell out of the final bill. The success of
Conrad’s point of order not only blocked the medical malpractice provision, but
also meant that the final bill that passed the Senate did not match the version of
the conference report approved by the House. The House did not approve the
Senate’s version until February of the following year.91
Another example from this period demonstrates how the Byrd rule
requirement that out-year deficit effects be determined only on a net basis can
produce perverse results.92 The Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act

86. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-51-01, 107TH CONG., ESTIMATED
THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 1836, at 1–8 (Comm. Print 2001).

BUDGET EFFECTS OF

87. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752 (2003).
88. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006).
89. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, House Approves Budget Cutbacks of $39.5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
2,
2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/02/politics/house-approves-budget-cutbacks-of-395billion.html [https://perma.cc/3BMP-HTCW].
90. 151 CONG. REC. S14,202 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 2005).
91. See Stolberg, supra note 89.
92. See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-119, 101 Stat. 754, 784–85 (1987); Yin, supra note 2, at 222–24.
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of 2005 (TIPRA),93 which did not pass until May 2006,94 extended lower tax rates
on capital gains and dividends. These changes were estimated to produce large
revenue losses in the first two years after the budget period.95 This revenue loss,
standing alone, violated the Byrd rule.96 In order to offset this revenue loss and
thus comply with the Byrd rule, the conference agreement added a provision that
expanded the ability of taxpayers after 2009 convert traditional IRAs into Roth
IRAs.97 But the Roth IRA conversion provision itself produced an estimated
revenue loss, in later years and overall.98 Nonetheless, as Professor George Yin
has chronicled, Senate Budget Committee Chair Judd Gregg “refused to identify
to the Parliamentarian any provision, including the Roth IRA conversion
provision, as extraneous for purposes of the Byrd Rule.” Instead, Gregg, a New
Hampshire Republican, “apparently took the position that the budget effects of
the bill beyond that time were not known and therefore could not be the basis for
a Byrd Ryle violation.”99 Because the vote on passage of the bill was only 54–
44,100 the refusal to identify a Byrd rule violation was crucial. Evaluating the
result, Professor Yin laments, “The end result was that the addition of a new tax
cut provision to a preexisting tax cut bill already in violation of the Byrd Rule
somehow was found to eliminate the violation.”101 Again, as with the 1997
Medicare eligibility episode, the Byrd rule in operation can produce
consequences quite far from what its author intended.
In 2007, after Democrats regained control of Congress, Budget Committee
Chair Kent Conrad introduced a resolution with a provision aimed at preventing
the Senate from considering reconciliation legislation that added to the deficit
over a five- or ten-year window. The so-called “Conrad rule” allowed any
Senator to raise a point of order against deficit-increasing reconciliation

93. See generally H.R. Rep. 109-62 (2005).
94. The reconciliation legislation became the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-122, 120 Stat. 345 (2006).
95. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-18-06, 109TH CONG., ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF
THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR THE “TAX INCREASE PREVENTION AND RECONCILIATION ACT
OF 2005,” at 1 (Comm. Print 2006).
96. See generally Wesley Elmore, Parliamentary Maneuvering Delays Tax Reconciliation
Conference, 110 TAX NOTES 1020 (2006).
97. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, supra note 95, at 1; ROBERT KEITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL33132, BUDGET RECONCILIATION LEGISLATION IN 2005–2006 UNDER THE FY BUDGET
RESOLUTION 41 (2006).
98. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, supra note 95, at 2; Leonard E. Burman, Roth Conversions as
Revenue Raisers: Smoke and Mirrors, 111 TAX NOTES 953, 953–54 (2006).
99. Yin, supra note 2, at 223; see also 152 CONG. REC. S4,443 (daily ed. May 11, 2006) (statement of
Sen. Gregg). Cf. 152 CONG. REC. S4,443 (statement of Sen. Levin criticizing Chair’s position); 152 CONG.
REC. S4,443 (statement of Sen. Baucus criticizing Chair’s position and introducing contradictory
projections from Finance Committee Democratic staff); Wesley Elmore, Senate Budget Chair Not
Opposed to Controversial Revenue Raiser, 111 TAX NOTES 15, 16 (2006) (discussing critics of Roth
conversion extension).
100. 152 CONG. REC. S4,446 (daily ed. May 11, 2006).
101. Yin, supra note 2, at 224. As Yin observes, “successful enforcement of the Byrd Rule depends
on highly uncertain long-term budget estimates.” Id.

APRILL_HEMEL_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2 2018]

5/16/2018 4:54 PM

THE TAX LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: A BYRD’S EYE VIEW

117

legislation, which would require a three-fifths vote to waive.102 The Senate
approved the measure by a 52–40 vote, effectively putting an end to the use of
budget reconciliation for deficit-increasing bills for the next eight years. After
Republicans regained control of the chamber in 2015, the Senate voted almost
entirely on party lines to repeal the Conrad rule, setting the stage for the deficitincreasing tax legislation of 2017.103
E. No Longer “Merely Incidental”: The Byrd Rule Reaches New Heights
President Obama’s inauguration in 2009 heralded a new era for budget
reconciliation and the Byrd rule. The incoming administration had little interest
in the deficit-increasing tax cuts that had been the stuff of reconciliation bills in
the Bush years. Its top domestic policy priority was health care, and President
Obama told congressional Democrats in April 2009 that they should be prepared
to use budget reconciliation to enact health care legislation if that proved
necessary to overcome a Senate filibuster.104
Several top Senate Democrats—including Budget Committee Chair Kent
Conrad and Finance Committee Chair Max Baucus—made clear early on that
they would prefer not to use budget reconciliation for health care reform.105 Two
events in 2009 made it possible for Conrad and Baucus to have their wish come
true. First, in April, Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania changed his party
affiliation to Democrat. Including independents Joe Lieberman of Connecticut
and Bernie Sanders of Vermont, who caucused with the majority, this switch
brought the size of the Democratic contingent to fifty-nine.106 Then, at the end of
June, Democrat Al Franken of Minnesota emerged triumphant from a protracted
recount.107 This victory meant that the Senate Democrats could break a filibuster.
In December 2009, the Senate voted along party lines to end debate and pass
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). But the story did not
end there.108 In January 2010, Republican Scott Brown scored a surprise win in a
102. S. Con. Res. 21, 110th Cong., 2d Sess., § 202 (May 17, 2007).
103. S. Con. Res. 11, 114th Cong., 1st Sess., § 3101(f) (May 5, 2015). Two Republican Senators, Ted
Cruz of Texas and Rand Paul of Kentucky, voted against the repeal resolution. A third, David Vitter of
Louisiana, was not present. Roll Call Vote 114th Congress – 1st Session, SENATE.GOV, http://www.
senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=114&session=1&vote=00171
[https://perma.cc/UW9N-9FWW] (last visited Mar. 26, 2018).
104. See Carl Hulse, Obama Tactic Shields Health Care Bill From a Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/25/us/politics/25budget.html [https://perma.cc/5YWP-746F].
105. Id.
106. To be sure, Senator Specter might have voted in favor of the Affordable Care Act even if he
had remained a Republican. But his switch of party and a looming Democratic Senate primary made it
more likely that he would support the central platform plank of the Democratic President. Cf. Carl Hulse,
Specter Switches Parties, N.Y. TIMES: THE CAUCUS (Apr. 28, 2009), https://thecaucus.blogs.
nytimes.com/2009/04/28/specter-will-run-as-a-democrat-in-2010
[https://perma.cc/LWH7-8EE3]
(discussing Specter’s primary calculus).
107. See Josh Kraushaar & Manu Raju, Coleman Concedes to Franken, POLITICO (June 30, 2009),
https://www.politico.com/story/2009/06/coleman-concedes-race-to-franken-024383
[https://perma.cc/HW39-HWVU].
108. See Emily Smith, Timeline of the Health Care Law, CNN (June 28, 2012), https://www.cnn.com/

APRILL_HEMEL_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

118

5/16/2018 4:54 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 81:99

special election for a U.S. Senate seat from Massachusetts previously occupied
by the late Edward Kennedy, and Brown’s victory brought the size of the
Democratic caucus back down to fifty-nine. House Democrats insisted on
changes to the Senate version of the ACA, and Senate Democrats now lacked
the sixty votes needed to break a filibuster on the compromise bill. However,
Congressional Democrats succeeded in breaking the logjam through a series of
creative parliamentary maneuvers. First, the House passed the Senate’s version
of the ACA without amendment, a move that allowed President Obama to sign
the ACA into law without the need for another Senate vote. Next, the House and
Senate used the budget reconciliation process to pass the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA), which included a number of
amendments to the ACA upon which House Democrats had insisted. These
included larger tax credits to help low- and middle-income households buy
insurance, a repeal of the controversial “Cornhusker Kickback,” a small
reduction in the penalty for individuals who failed to comply with the health
insurance mandate, and a new 3.8% tax on investment income of households
earning more than $250,000 a year.
During the Byrd bath over the HCERA, Parliamentarian Alan Frumin
reportedly advised Democrats that several provisions in early drafts of the
reconciliation bill would flunk the Byrd rule. These included a provision that
would have limited the ability of health insurers to raise rates, a provision that
would have allowed community health centers and federal grantees to purchase
prescription drugs at discounted prices, a measure that would have enhanced the
powers of the Independent Payment Advisory Board, a provision that would
have required existing group plans to cover preventive services, and a provision
that would have barred insurers from charging higher rates to smokers.109
Republican Senators also raised points of order against two provisions of the
HCERA that affected Pell grant funding, and those provisions were removed
from the final bill.110 These changes required the House to vote a second time on
the HCERA so that its version matched the Senate’s. The second vote, however,
delayed final passage by only a matter of hours.111
The Byrd rule clashes over the 2010 reconciliation bill represented only the
opening volley in what would become a years-long effort to undo President
Obama’s signature legislative achievement via budget reconciliation. In
November 2015, Parliamentarian Elizabeth MacDonough ruled that budget
reconciliation could not be used to repeal the ACA’s individual and employer
mandates—evidently because the budgetary effects were merely incidental to the
nonbudgetary consequences.112 Later that year, however, MacDonough

2012/06/28/politics/supreme-court-health-timeline/index.html [https://perma.cc/2YRN-QNP2].
109. See Jay Newton-Small, Al Frumin’s Bad Day, TIME (Mar. 25, 2010), http://swampland.time.com/
2010/03/25/al-frumins-bad-day [https://perma.cc/76BX-JQHR].
110. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, H.R. 4872, 111th Cong. (2010).
111. Id.
112. See Niels Lesniewski, Does Obamacare Repeal Have a Senate Path Without the Mandates?, ROLL
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apparently agreed with Senate Republicans that budget reconciliation could be
used to pass a bill that would leave the individual and employer mandates in place
but reduce the penalties for violating either mandate to zero.113 This decision had
only symbolic significance at the time because any legislation rolling back the
ACA would surely have been vetoed by President Obama. MacDonough’s
determination, however, set the stage for Republican efforts to repeal and
replace the ACA via budget reconciliation once the party gained control of
Congress and the presidency in the November 2016 election—and ultimately for
the successful repeal of the individual mandate as part of the December 2017 tax
law.
The successive Republican repeal-and-replace efforts in the spring and
summer of early 2017 brought new attention to the Byrd rule and to the
Parliamentarian. In the summer of 2017, as Republicans sought to pass the socalled “Better Care Reconciliation Act,” MacDonough concluded that a
provision that would have temporarily blocked Medicaid funding for Planned
Parenthood violated the Byrd rule. MacDonough also indicated that a provision
preventing ACA tax credits from being used to purchase health insurance that
covers abortion would have violated the Byrd rule’s requirements.114 Aside from
these abortion-related determinations, MacDonough made a number of other
significant decisions in Byrd baths leading up to a floor vote on ACA repeal
legislation in July 2017. Among the provisions that were removed from the
legislation based on MacDonough’s Byrd bath advice were:
— A provision authorizing states to allow certain Medicaid-funded plans to drop
coverage for “essential health benefits” that the Affordable Care Act required them to
cover;
— A provision establishing a six-month waiting period before consumers could enroll
in individual market plans if they had failed to maintain continuous coverage;
— A provision allowing states to modify the ACA’s medical loss ratio, which currently
requires insurers to spend at least 80% of premium dollars on medical care rather than
administrative costs and profits;
— A provision allowing states to use certain Medicaid funds for non-health purposes;
— A provision allowing insurers to charge older patients up to five times what they
charge younger patients; and
— A provision allowing states to waive various ACA rules (including rules related to
essential health benefits and preexisting conditions) if they adopted “innovation” plans

CALL (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.rollcall.com/news/home/does-obamacare-repeal-have-a-senate-pathwithout-the-mandates [https://perma.cc/G3AN-X3ZU].
113. Alexander Bolton, Senate Republicans Get Green Light for ObamaCare Repeal Bill, THE HILL
(Nov. 10, 2015), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/259752-senate-gop-gets-green-light-for-obamacarerepeal-bill [https://perma.cc/3G9J-FMNV].
114. SENATE BUDGET COMM. MINORITY STAFF, BACKGROUND ON THE BYRD RULE DECISIONS
(2017),
http://www.budget.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Background%20on%20Byrd%20Rule%20
decisions_7.21%5b1%5d.pdf [https://perma.cc/N65N-CD5A]. For a summary of some of MacDonough’s
other Byrd rule determinations during this summer’s health care debate, see Daniel Hemel, GrahamCassidy Is on a Collision Course With the Byrd Rule, MEDIUM (Sept. 19, 2017), http://medium.com/
whatever-source-derived/graham-cassidy-is-on-a-collision-course-with-the-byrd-rule-50a760f09419
[https://perma.cc/M69E-HUX6].
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that did not add to the federal deficit.115

Ultimately, the Republican effort to repeal the ACA in July 2017 failed when
three Republican Senators—Susan Collins of Maine, John McCain of Arizona,
and Lisa Murkowski of Alaska—voted against final passage.116 Yet the Senate
Parliamentarian soon would reemerge as a crucial player during the race to enact
a new tax law before the end of 2017, and the Byrd rule would go on to shape the
final bill in ways large and small.
IV
THE BYRD RULE AND THE 2017 TAX LAW
The tax bill that reached the Senate floor in December 2017 reflected the
Byrd rule’s influence in a number of important respects. The legislation was
crafted in the shadow of the Byrd rule’s prohibition on out-year deficit effects;
thus, the Senate Finance Committee added a series of sunset clauses so as to
ensure that the bill did not add to the deficit beyond the ten-year budget
window.117 Virtually all of the individual tax provisions—including the new rate
structure, the expansion of the child tax credit, the increase in the standard
deduction, and the new twenty percent deduction for pass-through business
income—will cease to apply after tax year 2025.118 The doubling of the estate and
gift tax exemption also will lapse on January 1, 2026.119 These sunset provisions
came as no surprise to informed observers, who recalled the bevy of similar
sunsets under the Bush tax cuts. Less predictable were the ways in which the
Senate bill was modified to comply with the Byrd rule’s prohibition on provisions
that have no or only a “merely incidental” budgetary effect.
The first unexpected turn of events came in late November, after the House
already had approved its version of the bill but before the Senate as a whole took
action. The Parliamentarian reportedly ruled that a “trigger” mechanism
suggested by Republican Senator Bob Corker of Tennessee—which would have
rolled back some of the bill’s tax cuts in the event that future revenue fell short
of optimistic projections—violated the Byrd rule.120 The basis for the
Parliamentarian’s opinion is unclear. The most plausible explanation is that the
trigger failed to satisfy the requirement that every provision must “produce a
change in outlays or revenues” because the provision would produce no such

115. See Hemel, supra note 114.
116. 163 CONG. REC. S4,399 (daily ed. July 27, 2017) (roll call vote); see also Robert Pear and Thomas
Kaplan, Senate Rejects Slimmed-Down Obamacare Repeal as McCain Votes No, N.Y. TIMES (July 27,
2017),
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/us/politics/obamacare-partial-repeal-senate-republicansrevolt.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/QRV9-KLDJ].
117. See generally H.R. 1, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017) (as passed by Senate, Dec. 20, 2017).
118. See id. § 1101(j) (sunset of increased standard deduction); § 11021(a) (sunset of increased child
credit); § 10221(a) (sunset of 20% deduction in new § 199A(h)).
119. Id. § 11061(a) (sunset of doubling of estate tax exclusion).
120. See Ryan McCrimmon, GOP Searching for New Tax Tweak After Senate Parliamentarian
Guidance, ROLL CALL (Nov. 30, 2017), http://www.rollcall.com/news/policy/tax-increase-trigger-wouldviolate-rules-perdue-says [https://perma.cc/5UV4-XM3H].
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change in the event that the trigger did not activate.121 Senator Corker initially
voted against the bill without the trigger, though he switched his position after
the House-Senate conference committee produced a compromise between the
two chambers.122
Hours before the Senate passed its first version of the bill at the beginning of
December, Senate Finance Committee Chair Orrin Hatch stripped a number of
provisions for purposes of “Byrd rule compliance,” according to a Finance
Committee release.123 Senator Hatch presumably acted after receiving advice
from the Parliamentarian that these provisions would violate the Byrd rule. The
measures stripped at the beginning of December included, with JCT’s estimates
of the ten-year revenue effects in parentheses124:
— A provision that would have required foreign airlines to pay U.S. corporate income
tax on a portion of their profits ($200 million revenue gain);
— A provision that would have allowed taxpayers to set up 529 college savings plans
for children in utero ($100 million revenue loss);
— A provision that would have repealed the tax-exempt status of professional sports
leagues, including the U.S. Tennis Association and the PGA Tour ($100 million revenue
gain);
— A provision that would have exempted certain private foundations from a two
hundred percent excise tax on the value of for-profit companies that they wholly own—
apparently intended to spare the foundation that holds the Newman’s Own company125
(revenue loss of less than $50 million, presumably because any foundation would choose
to sell the company rather than pay the tax); and
— A provision that would have limited the ability of plaintiff-side lawyers to deduct
expenses in pending contingency-fee cases ($50 million revenue gain).126

121. 2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1)(A) (2012).
122. See Jordan Buie, Sen. Bob Corker Reverses Course, Will Vote for Republican Tax Bill,
TENNESSEAN (Dec. 15, 2017), http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2017/12/15/sen-bob-corkerreverses-course-vote-republican-tax-bill/956602001 [https://perma.cc/YE2K-LWQD].
123. See TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT (H.R.) CHANGES MADE TO THE COMMITTEE-REPORTED BILL
DURING FLOOR CONSIDERATION: CHANGES MADE BY PERFECTING AMENDMENT (HATCH #1618) 2,
available
at http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/12.4.17%20SxS%20Appendix%20-%20
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QFB-JQZ9] (last visited Apr. 12, 2018) (Provisions Removed for Byrd
Rule Compliance).
124. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-62-17, 115TH CONG., ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF
MODIFICATIONS TO THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT,” AS REPORTED BY THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE
1–4 (Comm. Print 2017).
125. Brian Faler, Newman’s Own Faces Mammoth Tax Bill after Lawmakers Fail to Spare the
Foundation, POLITICO (Dec. 7, 2017), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/07/newmans-own-tax-billcongress-212925 [https://perma.cc/P92E-M7W9]. As discussed below, the provision benefitting
Newman’s Own ultimately became law as part of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115123, § 41110, 132 Stat. 64 (2018) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4943(g)). See infra note 168 and
accompanying text.
126. Significant changes to the low income housing tax credit—which, among other things, would
have renamed the credit as “the Affordable Housing Tax Credit” and made it harder for local officials
to block the construction of new developments in their communities—were also stripped from the Senate
bill on Byrd rule grounds. See Michael Novogradac, Senate Approves Tax Cuts and Jobs Act with Some
Changes from Committee-Passed Version, NOVOGRADAC (Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.novoco.com/notesfrom-novogradac/senate-approves-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-some-changes-committee-passed-version
[https://perma.cc/82FU-MATK].
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One notable aspect of the provisions stripped from the Senate bill in early
December was that several of them “scored”—in other words, the JCT assigned
a dollar value to their revenue effects. Recall that the vaccine price provision in
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 ultimately survived a Byrd rule
challenge notwithstanding the fact that CBO could not quantify the revenue
effects of the measure.127 Recall as well that the imported tobacco provision in
1993 legislation made it into the final bill even though the revenue effect—$6
million a year over five years—was smaller than several of the measures removed
by Senator Hatch.128 All of these decisions suggest that the current
Parliamentarian is applying the Byrd rule’s “merely incidental” proviso more
robustly than did her predecessors.
The list of provisions stripped from the Senate bill also illustrates the inherent
subjectivity of the Parliamentarian’s “merely incidental” determination. For
instance, consider whether the provision to allow taxpayers to set up 529 savings
plans for children in utero has significant non-budgetary consequences, such that
the revenue effects can be characterized as “merely incidental.” Key to that
determination is an assessment of the symbolic significance of a tax provision that
places fetuses on the same plane as children who have emerged from the womb.
Evidently, the Parliamentarian concluded that the provision was primarily
intended to convey a message regarding the morality of abortion rather than to
facilitate college savings by expecting parents. That seems to be the correct
determination, but it requires an evaluation of motives as well as budget math.
The list of provisions removed in early December also indicates that measures
will run afoul of the “merely incidental” proviso if they affect a limited number
of taxpayers. Notably, this pattern applies both to provisions that bestow benefits
on a narrow group—for example, the Newman’s Own provision—as well as
measures that would bring such limited benefits to an end—for example, the
foreign airline and sports league provisions. Such applications of the Byrd rule
stand in contrast to previous Parliamentarians’ interpretations. For example, a
provision that conveyed several hundred acres of public land to the Texas Plains
Girl Scout Council in exchange for one dollar—arguably the epitome of a special
interest measure—survived a Byrd rule challenge during the debate over the
Balanced Budget Act of 1995.129
The Senate Parliamentarian’s Byrd rule determinations continued to shape
the tax legislation as it moved closer to passage. In mid-December, the
Parliamentarian apparently informed Senators that a controversial provision in
the House version—which would have modified the so-called Johnson
amendment—violated the Byrd rule’s “merely incidental” proviso.130 The

127. See supra text accompanying notes 59–60.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 61–62.
129. See 141 CONG REC. S17,247 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1995).
130. See Heather Long, In Small Win for Democrats, the Final Tax Bill Will Not Include a Provision
Allowing Churches to Endorse Political Candidates, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2017),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/12/14/in-small-win-for-democrats-the-final-tax-

APRILL_HEMEL_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2 2018]

THE TAX LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: A BYRD’S EYE VIEW

5/16/2018 4:54 PM

123

Johnson amendment—named for its sponsor, then-Senator and future President
Lyndon Johnson—states that a nonprofit organization exempt from taxation
under section 501(c)(3) cannot “participate in, or intervene in . . . any political
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.” The
House bill would have created a safe harbor for statements “made in the ordinary
course of the organization’s regular and customary activities” that results in “not
more than de minimis incremental expenses.”131 The safe harbor would have
applied from 2019 to 2023.132
The question of whether the Johnson amendment violates the Byrd rule’s
“merely incidental” proviso illustrates the ambiguity and subjectivity of that
restriction. On the one hand, the House provision potentially would have
enormous consequences for churches and other charities. As one co-author of
this article wrote in the New York Times, “permitting charities to engage directly
in electoral politics will reduce the respect they have long been afforded” and
“will harm the sector.”133 It may also distort the political marketplace by allowing
tax-deductible donations to go toward supporting candidates. And the motive for
the provision clearly had little to do with revenue. Then-candidate Donald
Trump made repeal of the Johnson amendment a major component of his appeal
to religious conservatives during the 2016 campaign.134 House Republicans had
introduced legislation called the “Free Speech Fairness Act” to roll back the
Johnson amendment several times before, with nary a reference to the revenue
effects.135
On the other hand, the House provision would indeed have had a revenue
effect. JCT estimated that this change would lose revenue of $2.1 billion over the
five years for which it would have been in place, as donors who otherwise might
bill-wont-include-a-provision-to-allow-churches-to-endorse-political-candidates/?utm_term=.c0e999b
7288f [https://perma.cc/QM95-U4FR].
131. H.R. 781, 115th Congress (2017).
132. See HOUSE PASSED: Historic Legislation to Overhaul Nation’s Tax Code for 1st Time in 31
Years, WAYSANDMEANS.HOUSE.GOV (Nov. 16, 2017) https://waysandmeans.house.gov/house-passedhistoric-legislation-overhaul-nations-tax-code-1st-time-31-years/ [https://perma.cc/DSW5-K84F]. As
originally proposed, the exception applied only to churches. See H.R. 1 § 5201, 115th Cong. (1st Sess.
2017). The House provision was amended to apply to all section 501(c)(3) organizations but only for the
period beginning after December 31, 2018 and ending on December 31, 2023. See Amendment to the
Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 1 Offered by Mr. Brady of Texas,
WAYSANDMEANSFORMS.HOUSE.GOV (Nov. 9, 2017), http://waysandmeansforms.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/chairman_amendment_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/K82V-2Q3F].
133. Ellen P. Aprill, Opinion, Leave the Johnson Amendment Alone, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2017),
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/10/opinion/johnson-amendment-campaigns.html
[https://perma.cc/S339-JMK3].
134. See Sarah Pulliam, Bailey, Trump Promised to Destroy the Johnson Amendment. Congress is
Targeting it Now, WASH. POST (July 14, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-offaith/wp/2017/06/30/trump-promised-to-destroy-the-johnson-amendment-congress-is-targeting-itnow/?utm_term=.63c690e90414 [https://perma.cc/S4YV-VE64]; see generally Ellen P. Aprill, Amending
the Johnson Amendment in the Age of Cheap Speech, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (Jan. 16, 2018),
http://illinoislawreview.org/online/amending-the-johnson-amendment-in-the-age-of-cheap-speech
[https://perma.cc/LN8J-HEKS].
135. See Free Speech Fairness Act, H.R. 6195, 114th Cong. (2016); see also Aprill, supra note 134.
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have made nondeductible contributions to social welfare and political
organizations instead made deductible gifts to 501(c)(3) entities.136 The
Parliamentarian, however, decided that this dollar amount did not shield the
provision from the Byrd rule.137 As far as we are aware, this decision was the first
and only time that the Parliamentarian has determined that a provision with
revenue effects exceeding $1 billion flunks the Byrd rule on “merely incidental”
grounds.
The Senate Parliamentarian’s guidance with respect to the Johnson
amendment moved the House-Senate conference committee to remove that
measure from its conference report. Still other provisions of the conference
report would be the subject of last-minute Byrd rule challenges. One such
provision, pushed by Republican Senator Ted Cruz of Texas, would have
permitted Section 529 accounts to be used for homeschooling.138 A second would
have exempted colleges from a new 1.4% excise tax on endowment income if
their students were not “tuition-paying.” This exemption was reportedly
designed by Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, who sought to spare
Berea College in his home state of Kentucky from the new tax.139
The Parliamentarian’s rulings on these two measures reflect her apparent
judgment that the political and symbolic motivations for the homeschooling
provision and the carveout from the new excise tax outweighed the (nonzero)
budgetary consequences. Yet they also reflect a decision to splice sections of the
conference report in ways that are hard to rationalize. In the Section 529 case,
the relevant provision of the conference report allowed for funds from 529
accounts to be used for expenses related to elementary and secondary public,
private, and religious school attendance as well as for homeschooling. The
Parliamentarian decided to analyze the homeschooling element separately from
the rest of the provision. In the case of the excise tax on endowment income, the
Parliamentarian evidently considered the term “tuition-paying” apart from all
that surrounded it rather than considering the new excise tax measure as a whole.
In these cases, the Parliamentarian appears to be applying the Byrd rule on a
word-by-word and sentence-by-sentence basis.

136. See generally STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-49-17, 115TH CONG., ESTIMATED REVENUE
EFFECTS OF THE CHAIRMAN’S AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 1 (Comm.
Print 2017).
137. See Richard Rubin, Proposal to Let Churches and Other Nonprofits Get Political Blocked from
Tax Bill, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/tax-bill-2017/card/1513303223.
138. See Cruz Provision on 529 Plans for Homeschoolers Falls out of Bill, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 20,
2017), http://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/tax-bill-2017/card/1513748902.
139. The parliamentarian stripped the qualification “tuition-paying” from the requirements
regarding the minimum number of students triggering the provision. Berea College admits only students
whose families cannot pay for college. See Erica L. Green, How a Tuition-Free College Turned Into a
Casualty of the Tax Wars, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/
us/politics/berea-college-bernie-sanders-mcconnell-tax-cut.html [https://perma.cc/V9T2-JUB7]. Note
that this provision also became law in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123, § 41109(a),
132 Stat. 64 (2018) (amending 26 U.S.C. § 4968(b)(1)). See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
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Not all of the Senate Parliamentarian’s rulings regarding the “merely
incidental” proviso went against the Republicans. Most controversially, the
Parliamentarian advised that a measure opening the Alaska National Wildlife
Refuge (ANWR) to oil drilling did not run afoul of the Byrd rule even though
the CBO projected that the measure would raise only $910 million in leasing
revenue over a ten-year window,140 and even though ecologists and biologists said
that the measure would have a dramatic impact on the habitats of polar bears and
other Arctic animals.141 The Parliamentarian reportedly said that an early version
of the ANWR provision violated the Byrd rule because it encroached on the
jurisdiction of the Senate Environmental and Public Works Committee,142 but
Senate Republicans resolved that concern with a minor wording change that left
the heart of the ANWR provision intact.143
Perhaps the oddest Byrd rule challenge was to the short name of the bill, the
“Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.” According to a spokesman for Senate Budget
Committee ranking member Bernie Sanders, “[t]he short title has no budgetary
impact.”144 The Parliamentarian agreed. Her determination flew in the face of
advice given by her predecessor, Alan Frumin, who indicated in the summer of
1993 that he did not view short title provisions as violations of the Byrd rule. A
Budget Committee print from around that time noted that the free pass for short
title provisions was apparently motivated by “the theory that the [Byrd] Rule
does not cover trifling matters.”145
These Byrd rule challenges to the conference report led to last-minute
maneuvering by both parties. On December 19, 2017, the House passed the
conference report in a form that included the 529 provision, the exemption from
the endowment tax for colleges without tuition-paying students, and the “Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act” short title. When the Senate took up the conference report
later that same day, Senator Sanders raised points of order regarding each of
these provisions.146 Republican Senator Mike Enzi of Wyoming moved for waiver
of Sanders’s objections.147

140. 163 CONG. REC. S7,710 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2017).
141. Id. at S7,708–10.
142. See Niels Lesniewski, Tax Overhaul’s Arctic Drilling Byrd Problems Resolved, ROLL CALL
(Nov. 29, 2017), http://www.rollcall.com/news/policy/byrd-rule-imperils-arctic-drilling-provisions-tax-bill
[https://perma.cc/D23W-MFK3].
143. See Elwood Brehmer, ANWR Clears Senate, Young Named to Conference Panel, ALASKA J.
COM. (Dec. 5, 2017), http://www.alaskajournal.com/2017-12-05/anwr-clears-senate-young-namedconference-panel#.WmVlRZO7_os [https://perma.cc/YL6C-GM3S].
144. Naomi Jagoda, Senate Parliamentarian Rules against GOP Tax Bill’s Name, THE HILL (Dec. 19,
2017), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/365691-senate-parliamentarian-rules-against-gop-tax-bills-name
[https://perma.cc/XJN5-89E9].
145. DAUSTER, supra note 15, at 206.
146. 163 CONG. REC. S8,101 (Dec. 29, 2017). Senator Sanders specified that the short title violated
the Byrd rule constraint requiring a change in outlays or revenues and that the other two provision came
within the merely incidental category.
147. Id.
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The ensuing debate on the Senate floor focused primarily on the Cruz
amendment that would have allowed 529 plans to be used for homeschooling.
Senator Cruz accused his Democratic colleagues of taking away an important
benefit from “50 million schoolkids” on the basis of “an obscure procedur[al] rule
that nobody at home knows what it is.”148 Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon, the
ranking Democrat on the Finance Committee, responded that the “modest
budget impact” of the Cruz amendment “is vastly outweighed by the profound
impact, as a matter of social and education policy, of providing Federal support
for homeschooling for the first time.”149 The motion to waive the Byrd rule with
respect to the Cruz amendment, the endowment tax exemption, and the short
title ultimately failed on a strict party line vote.150
The fallout from the Byrd rule violations in the conference report turned out
to be limited. Republicans in the Senate passed a “clean” bill early on the
morning of December 20 omitting the measures that had been the subject of
successful Byrd rule challenges. House Republicans re-passed the modified
conference report later that same day. The Byrd rule made for high drama on CSPAN, but did not ultimately prevent passage of the legislation before members
of the House and Senate left Washington, D.C., for the winter holiday.
V
THE FUTURE OF THE BYRD RULE
The immediate aftermath of the passage of the most sweeping tax law of the
last thirty years is an appropriate moment for reflection on the Byrd rule’s role
in the tax lawmaking process. This final part considers whether and how the Byrd
rule will continue to shape future tax legislative efforts, concluding with tentative
thoughts on the normative implications of the Byrd rule’s increasing prominence.
A. Three Futures for the Byrd Rule
The race toward tax “reform” at the end of 2017 might seem to suggest that
the Byrd rule will continue to shape the tax legislative process in important ways.
As long as a narrow majority in the Senate seeks to enact tax legislation without
broad bipartisan support, budget reconciliation would seem to be the only
available route around a filibuster. From the vantage point of early 2018, it
appears exceedingly unlikely that either party will gain a sixty-vote Senate
supermajority in the upcoming midterm elections, and it seems even less
probable that the relative amity between the parties characteristic of the late
1980s and early 1990s will reemerge anytime soon. All of this suggests that the
Byrd rule’s prominence in the tax lawmaking process will be long lasting.
There are, however, two alternative futures for the Byrd rule and the tax
lawmaking process. The first would involve an end to the Senate filibuster.

148. 163 CONG. REC. S8,139 (daily ed. Dec.19, 2017).
149. Id.
150. 163 CONG. REC. S8,141 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2017).
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Without the filibuster, there would be no need to use the budget reconciliation
process to circumvent the threat of endless floor debate. Thus, the Byrd rule
would be rendered little more than an arcane limit on a rarely invoked procedural
pathway.
The second alternative future would involve undermining the Senate
Parliamentarian’s independence or influence. The Majority Leader could instruct
the Secretary of the Senate to install a Parliamentarian who would rubber-stamp
majority-backed bills, or the Presiding Officer could refuse to heed the
Parliamentarian’s advice on controversial Byrd rule questions. In this scenario,
the legislative filibuster would remain in place, and so the Senate majority still
would need to rely on budget reconciliation to enact legislation by simple
majority vote, but the Byrd rule would no longer impose binding limits on the
contents of budget reconciliation bills.
As for the first, one of the most curious facts about the Senate is that the rule
requiring a three-fifths supermajority for cloture can itself be changed by simple
majority vote.151 Senate Democrats invoked this so-called “nuclear option” in
November 2013 to eliminate the use of the filibuster against all nominations
except for nominations to the U.S. Supreme Court.152 Senate Republicans did the
same in April 2017 to allow for cloture with respect to Supreme Court
nominations by simple majority vote.153 And President Trump called on Senate
Republicans to invoke the nuclear option again to pass a budget during the
government shutdown of January 2018.154
Yet there are several factors that may deter the Senate majority from
invoking the nuclear option for legislation. First, veteran lawmakers who have
internalized the Senate’s norms may be reluctant to break with the chamber’s
traditions. Second, members of the Senate majority are well aware that they may
find themselves in the minority in the future, and thus that disempowering the
minority today means that they may be members of a disempowered minority
just a few years down the road. Third, the more moderate members of the Senate
majority may be concerned that ending the filibuster will render them irrelevant.
For example, the fifty-first most conservative member of a Republican-controlled
Senate knows that, without the filibuster, fifty of her Republican colleagues can
pass legislation that she opposes. Fourth and finally, specific Senators––namely

151. See Charlie Savage, The Senate Filibuster, Explained, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2017),
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/us/politics/filibuster-supreme-court-neil-gorsuch.html
[https://perma.cc/TEV6-8NMB].
152. Id.
153. See Ed O’Keefe & Sean Sullivan, Senate Republicans Go “Nuclear,” Pave the Way for Gorsuch
Confirmation to Supreme Court, WASH. POST (Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
powerpost/senate-poised-for-historic-clash-over-supreme-court-nominee-neil-gorsuch/2017/04/06/
40295376-1aba-11e7-855e-4824bbb5d748_story.html?utm_term=.77fb5fa3a765 [https://perma.cc/38NBG2E6].
154. See Rebecca Savransky, Trump Calls for Republicans to Trigger “Nuclear Option” If Stalemate
Continues, THE HILL (Jan. 21, 2018), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/369971-trump-callsfor-republicans-to-go-nuclear-if-stalemate-continues [https://perma.cc/8FG5-F2ZP].
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senior members of the Budget Committee––have an interest in the budget
reconciliation process remaining relevant. Without the filibuster, the budget
reconciliation process would be mostly irrelevant, and these Senators would exert
significantly less influence over legislative outcomes.
To be sure, the first three factors did not prevent the Senate from changing
its procedural rules several times in the past, nor did they prevent the Democratic
and Republican caucuses from going nuclear on nominations in 2013 and 2017,
respectively. The fourth factor—senior Budget Committee members’ interest in
maintaining the relevance of budget reconciliation—presumably would not affect
those Senators’ support for the nuclear option with respect to nominations, which
never go through the Budget Committee. At the same time, Senators who are not
members of the Budget Committee may have an interest in reducing the use of
budget reconciliation for precisely the reason that Senator Dole stated: the
budget reconciliation process potentially makes non-Budget Committee
members feel as if they occupy subordinate positions.
As for the possibility that the Senate majority will undermine the
Parliamentarian’s independence and influence, some of the same factors that
may make the Senate majority reluctant to end the filibuster also may deter them
from pursuing this alternative path. The norm of deference to the
Parliamentarian on procedural matters is well entrenched, and members of the
majority know that if Presiding Officers from their party disregard this norm or
if the Majority Leader installs a partisan as Parliamentarian, the other party will
do the same if and when it gains control of the chamber. Still, there is at least
some support among Senate Republicans for going down this road: most
outspokenly, in March 2017, Senator Cruz urged his Republican colleagues to
consider whether the Presiding Officer should simply disregard the
Parliamentarian’s advice if the Parliamentarian proved to be an obstacle to ACA
repeal.155
The perils of prediction apply here, and neither of these alternative futures
can be confidently ruled out. What is clear is that the Senate’s supermajoritarian
norms have proven to be remarkably resilient, though somewhat less so over the
past half-decade. The surest conclusion is that as long as the legislative filibuster
remains in place and the Parliamentarian continues to be an independent
interpreter of Senate procedure whose views are heeded by the Presiding Officer,
the budget reconciliation process will likely remain an important route for tax
legislation and that the Byrd rule will continue to shape outcomes.
B. The Byrd Rule’s Ramifications
The most charitable view of the Byrd rule goes something like the following:
by preventing the Senate from passing legislation that increases the deficit

155. See Alexander Bolton, Cruz: Let’s Overrule Senate Officer to Expand ObamaCare Bill, THE
HILL (Mar. 9, 2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/323272-cruz-lets-overrule-senate-officer-toexpand-obamacare-bill [https://perma.cc/568C-SNDC].
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beyond the budget window, the Byrd rule imposes a measure of fiscal discipline
on Congress. Insofar as the “merely incidental” proviso leads to the excision of
provisions such as the Newman’s Own tax change and the Berea College
carveout, the rule serves to limit the use of budget reconciliation for what are
essentially giveaways to favored interests. By narrowing the range of issues that
can be considered in a budget reconciliation bill, the rule reduces the risk that tax
and spending legislation will be held up by fights over largely unrelated issues,
such as abortion or immigration. And by forcing the majority party to seek
support from the minority on more matters, the Byrd rule promotes a more
consensus-oriented lawmaking process.
There is a measure of truth to each of these claims. But the Byrd rule is also
susceptible to less charitable interpretations: the rule’s effect on fiscal discipline
is ambiguous and perhaps even perverse; it can be an obstacle to compromise as
much as a catalyst; it probably contributes to the tax code’s extraordinary
complexity; and the way that the Byrd rule is presently applied—through closeddoor Byrd baths and unpublished advice from the Parliamentarian to the
Presiding Officer—makes an already-opaque tax lawmaking process even less
transparent.
1. Fiscal Discipline
As a tool for imposing fiscal discipline on Congress, the Byrd rule has turned
out to be somewhat of a toothless tiger. Congress can pass legislation that
increases the deficit during the window set by the budget resolution and then add
sunset provisions to avert out-year deficit effects without running afoul of the
rule. This well-documented practice156 has become a standard tactic for Senate
Republicans seeking to enact tax cuts. Additionally, successive extensions can
transform nominally “temporary” deficit-increasing provisions into effectively
permanent features of the tax code.
Arguably, the Byrd rule has now become worse than worthless as a deficitcontrol mechanism. First, once the House and Senate pass a concurrent
resolution with a deficit cap, that cap tends to become both a ceiling and a floor.
Thus, the budget resolution passed in October 2017 allowed Congress to add $1.5
trillion to the deficit over a ten-year window, and the final legislation added more
than $1.4 trillion to the deficit on a static basis.157 The $1.5 trillion figure operated
both as a limit on what Congress could add to the deficit and as a license to run
up a tab of approximately that amount. Previous budget reconciliation efforts
reflect a similar pattern of Congress setting a cap for itself and then increasing
the deficit right up to the cap.158
156. See Jonathan Curry, Senate Republicans Contort Tax Bill to Fit Byrd Rule Box, TAX ANALYSTS
(Nov. 16, 2017), http://www.taxanalysts.org/content/senate-republicans-contort-tax-bill-fit-byrd-rule-box
[https://perma.cc/V9HM-S394]; Rebecca M. Kysar, The Tricks That Will Deliver Tax Reform, SLATE
(June 1, 2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2017/06/the_budget_gimmicks_the_
gop_could_use_for_tax_reform.html [https://perma.cc/2ZD2-KYUM].
157. See Curry, supra note 156.
158. For example, the budget resolution agreed to May 2001 allowed for a $1.35 trillion increase in
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Second, the elaborate exercise of setting medium-term deficit caps and then
complying with those caps via sunset provisions potentially allows lawmakers to
convince themselves—and perhaps some of their more gullible constituents—
that they are acting in a fiscally responsible manner when in fact their actions are
likely to lead to long-term deficit increases. To be sure, the ruse is so transparent
that one wonders whether it matters at all. But insofar as nominal compliance
with the Byrd rule reinforces a fiction of fiscal responsibility, it may actually
undermine fiscal discipline in practice.
A third way in which the Byrd rule may perversely undermine fiscal discipline
is by preventing Congress from passing measures such as the Brownback-Kohl
and Frist amendments, as well as the trigger mechanism proposed by Senator
Corker. A provision that prohibits Congress from considering future deficitincreasing legislation through budget reconciliation—or that triggers tax
increases in the event that revenues thresholds are not met—evidently runs afoul
of the Byrd rule’s prohibition on measures with no budgetary effect. It is not
obvious that the text of the Byrd rule requires this result—and quite obvious that
the consequence is at odds with the Byrd rule’s anti-deficit intent. The irony is
that but for the Byrd rule, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 would have added a
statutory provision that could have prevented Congress from passing the deficitbusting tax cuts of 2001, 2003, and 2017.159
Fourth, the Byrd rule may in some circumstances encourage Congress to add
deficit-increasing measures to reconciliation bills for the purpose of Byrd rule
compliance. The 2006 Roth IRA episode is one such illustration. As noted above,
Congress added a provision in TIPRA allowing for traditional-to-Roth IRA
conversions starting in 2010 so that the legislation would appear to be deficitneutral beyond the budget window, even though the provision almost certainly
increases the deficit in the long run. To be fair, Congress rarely adds a deficitincreasing provision to a reconciliation bill solely for the purpose of cosmetic
compliance with the Byrd rule, but the very fact that this maneuver occurred in
full public view raises serious doubts about the rule’s efficacy.160
the deficit over ten years, and the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that the reconciliation bill
would add $1.349 trillion to the deficit over a decade. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-51-01,
107TH CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 1836, at 3
(Comm. Print 2001); H. Con. Res. 83, 107th Cong., 1st Sess., § 103 (2001). The budget resolution agreed
to in April 2003 allowed for an addition of $350 billion to the deficit, and the Joint Committee estimated
that the resulting reconciliation bill would add $349.7 billion to the deficit over that timeframe. See STAFF
OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-55-03, 108TH CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE
AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 2, THE “JOBS AND GROWTH TAX RELIEF RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2003,” at 2
(Comm. Print 2003); H.R. Con. Res. 95, 108th Cong., 1st Sess., § 202 (2001).
159. Emphasis is placed on the phrase “could have” rather than “would have.” Of course, even if the
Frist amendment had become law in 1997, the Senate might have mustered 60 votes to repeal it at a later
date, or the proponents of the 2001, 2003, and 2017 tax cuts conceivably could have cobbled together a
filibuster-proof majority for deficit-busting tax reductions.
160. Also note that Byrd rule compliance is not the only reason why Congress might, under some
circumstances, pass provisions that appear to reduce the deficit in the short term but that have the
opposite effect over the long term. The Byrd rule is, however, an additional impetus for Congress to play
games with budgetary arithmetic.
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Finally, the Byrd rule’s prohibition against adding to the deficit beyond the
budget window has force only if the budget window is relatively short. Early
budget resolutions covered one-year windows. Budget resolutions in the 1980s
looked three years out; resolutions in the early 1990s established five-year
windows; the Balanced Budget Act of 1995 stretched that to seven years; and the
budget resolution passed in 1999 set the first ten-year window.161 In theory, there
is nothing standing in the way of a budget window lasting twenty or thirty years,
or even longer. Republican Senator Pat Toomey of Pennsylvania has advocated
a longer budget window, and Trump administration officials have expressed
interest in the idea.162 The rule against out-year deficit effects accomplishes little
if the budget window lasts an entire generation.
2. Subject Matter Limits
The Byrd rule’s prohibition on provisions with “merely incidental” budgetary
effects is arguably necessary in order to preserve the Senate’s supermajoritarian
norm. Otherwise, a simple majority could accomplish virtually anything via
budget reconciliation.163 In this respect, the Byrd rule preserves the minority
party’s power in the Senate. It also keeps certain issues off the table in budget
negotiations, possibly reducing the risk that reconciliation bills will be held up by
debates over abortion, immigration, and other controversial topics.
In practice, however, the subject matter limitations imposed by the Byrd rule
do not always appear to be very stringent. If a measure that opens the Alaska
National Wildlife Refuge to drilling does not violate the “merely incidental”
proviso, one wonders what other controversial measures might pass the Byrd rule
test. For example, could a future Democratic-controlled Senate use budget
reconciliation to reinstate the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)
program, which—according to one estimate164—would raise $60 billion in federal
revenue over a decade? Could budget reconciliation be used to legalize and then
tax the sale of marijuana, which could raise $132 billion in federal revenue over
nine years?165 The answers to these questions would depend heavily on the
subjective judgment of the individual who occupies the Parliamentarian position

161. BILL HENIFF, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30297, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
RESOLUTIONS: HISTORICAL INFORMATION 11–13, tbl.5 (2015).
162. See Naomi Jagoda, Prominent Conservatives: Extend the Budget Window to Pass Tax Cuts, THE
HILL (June 14, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/337768-prominent-conservatives-extend-thebudget-window-to-pass-tax-cuts [https://perma.cc/R3DN-UMY5].
163. No such rule was in place for the first eleven years of budget reconciliation, though the risk that
the majority party would use budget reconciliation to circumvent the filibuster may have been smaller in
the less partisan environment of the 1970s and early 1980s.
164. See Ike Brannon & Logan Albright, The Economic and Fiscal Impact of Repealing DACA,
CATO INST. (Jan. 18, 2017), http://www.cato.org/blog/economic-fiscal-impact-repealing-daca
[https://perma.cc/TZ7K-PTUQ].
165. See Katie Zezima, Study: Legal Marijuana Could Generate More Than $132 Billion in Federal
Tax Revenue and 1 Million Jobs, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2018), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/2018/01/10/study-legal-marijuana-could-generate-more-than-132-billion-in-federal-taxrevenue-and-1-million-jobs/?utm_term=.27cda74008e9 [https://perma.cc/X6WJ-JJM3].
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at the time the questions arise. And if policies with these sorts of sweeping nonbudgetary consequences can be enacted by simple majority vote, then the subject
matter limitations of the Byrd rule are as chimerical as the Byrd rule’s deficit
limitations.
Even if the Byrd rule does limit the subject matter of reconciliation bills in
meaningful ways, the impact of such limitations on the prospects for bipartisan
compromise are uncertain. Under some circumstances, “issue linkage” (i.e.,
adding additional issues to be bargained over in a negotiation) can indeed reduce
the probability of agreement.166 Democrats and Republicans might, to use a notso-hypothetical example, have similar views regarding the extension of funding
for the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) but very different views on
immigration. Adding immigration to the mix of issues could scuttle a deal on
CHIP. In other cases, issue linkage makes agreement much more likely. Jack and
Jill may be at loggerheads over whether to see the movie “Darkest Hour” or
“Ladybird,” but adding another issue (say, where to go to dinner afterwards) may
allow them to reach a deal. Thus, it is difficult to arrive at any general statement
as to whether the Byrd rule’s subject matter limitations make compromise more
likely or less so.
Insofar as the Byrd rule stands in the way of what might be described as
special interest giveaways, this impact too has uncertain normative implications.
One view of the Newman’s Own provision is that it simply allowed a private
foundation to run a profitable business in a socially responsible manner and
channel the proceeds to charitable causes—not necessarily an undesirable
outcome.167 (In any event, the Newman’s Own modification ultimately became
law as part of the shutdown-averting Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018.168) One
perspective on the Berea College provision is that it would have incentivized
wealthy colleges and universities to eliminate tuition for more students—again, a
potentially palatable result (and again, a result that Congress ultimately
accomplished by adding to the Bipartisan Budget Act an exemption from the
endowment tax for schools such as Berea that do not charge tuition169).
Moreover, the ability to include special interest provisions in legislation arguably
serves to “grease the locked wheels of government,”170 as journalist Jonathan
166. On the variable effects of issue linkage in negotiations, see generally T. Clifton Morgan, Issue
Linkages in International Crisis Bargaining, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 311 (1990).
167. See Daniel Hemel, A (Lite) Defense of Newman’s Own, MEDIUM (Aug. 22, 2016),
http://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/a-lite-defense-of-newmans-own-d89ffa145b03
[https://perma.cc/39A8-ETCQ].
168. Pub. L. No. 115-123, § 41110, 132 Stat. 64 (2018) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4943(g)). The
Byrd rule did not apply to the Budget Act, which passed through normal order by a filibuster-proof 7128 margin rather than through the budget reconciliation process. See Thomas Kaplan, Trump Signs
Budget Deal to Raise Spending and Reopen Government, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/08/us/politics/congress-budget-deal-vote.html [https://perma.cc/BB3TEVZB].
169. Id. § 41109(a), 132 Stat. 64 (amending 26 U.S.C. § 4968(b)(1)).
170. See Jonathan Allen, The Case for Earmarks, VOX (June 30, 2015), http://www.vox.com/2015/6/
30/8864869/earmarks-pork-congress [https://perma.cc/3EB8-YGA6].
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Allen and several others have argued in the analogous context of congressional
earmarks. A world in which lawmakers cannot reward favored constituents
through targeted provisions may be a world in which relatively little gets
accomplished. Furthermore, the Byrd rule as applied in the most recent tax
legislative effort had the effect of freezing in place provisions of the Code—such
as the tax exemption for professional sports leagues—that might be characterized
as special interest provisions in their own right. The Byrd rule may prevent new
pork from being added to the Code, but it preserves the pork that is already there.
3. Complexity
One clear consequence of the Byrd rule is that it causes Congress to add
complexity to the Internal Revenue Code. Title 26 is now a tangle of provisions
with looming expiration dates as well as others that will not come into effect again
for another eight years. Uncertainty as to whether temporary provisions will be
extended makes it harder for taxpayers to develop long-term plans. The
imperative to avoid out-year deficit effects has real and negative practical effects.
All of these considerations are compounded by the fact that the Byrd rule
makes it harder for Congress to pursue simplification measures. Consider the
story of the Form 1040SR, intended to be “a simplified income tax return . . . for
use by persons who are age 65 or older.”171 An early version of the tax plan that
emerged from the Senate Finance Committee in November 2017 instructed the
IRS to develop a new Form 1040SR and make it available to senior citizens
starting in 2019.172 However, Senate Finance Committee Chair Hatch removed
the provision from the bill at the beginning of December for reasons related to
Byrd rule compliance—presumably because the budgetary effects would be
“merely incidental” to the simplification benefits.
The point here is not to suggest that the Byrd rule blocks the Senate from
pursuing tax simplification. With sixty votes in the Senate—either to waive a
Byrd rule point of order or to pass legislation through the normal process—
simplification measures such as the Form 1040SR provision remain possible (and,
indeed, Congress ultimately enacted the Form 1040SR provision as part of the
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018).173 What the Byrd rule does do is encourage
Congress to make a mess of a code while also making it at least marginally more
difficult for Congress to clean that mess up.
4. Transparency
Last but not least, the Byrd rule adds to the opacity of a legislative process
that is already far from transparent to outsiders.174 The Parliamentarian gives

171. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-51-17, 115TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF THE CHAIRMAN’S
MODIFICATION TO THE CHAIRMAN’S MARK OF THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT” 32 (Comm. Print
2017).
172. Id.
173. Pub. L. No. 115-123, § 41106, 132 Stat. 64 (2018).
174. See Yin, supra note 2, at 225–26.
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guidance to staffers behind closed doors, and the Parliamentarian’s advice to the
Presiding Officer literally takes the form of a whisper.175 At least in the latter case,
the outcome of the Parliamentarian’s thought process becomes public: those
watching in the Senate Gallery or on C-Span—or reading the Congressional
Record afterwards—can see how the Presiding Officer ultimately ruled on a
point of order. When it comes to closed-door Byrd baths, there is no public record
of the list of provisions challenged on Byrd rule grounds or how the
Parliamentarian came down on each one. What little we know comes from what
Senators and their staffers choose to share.
This lack of transparency is normatively problematic for at least two reasons.
First, members of the public cannot comprehensively assess the actions of their
elected representatives without knowing what constraints those representatives
faced. For example, we know from a single line of a Senate Finance Committee
release that the repeal of the tax-exempt status of professional sports leagues was
removed from the 2017 tax law “for Byrd rule compliance.”176 We do not know
why the provision flunked the Byrd rule’s test or whether it could have been
drafted so as to pass. Was the Byrd rule a genuine impediment to the provision’s
enactment, or is it a bogeyman that Senators have used to justify a change
requested by a well-resourced interest group? Concededly, a certain degree of
opacity is inevitable whenever lawmakers hash out legislative language in Capitol
cloakrooms, but the Byrd bath process makes it even harder for voters and
activists to know what is going on.
Second, the fact that the Parliamentarian need not explain her determinations
in public raises the risk that those determinations will be inconsistent and
unsupported. Why did repeal of the tax exemption for professional sports leagues
flunk the Byrd rule test while the opening of ANWR to drilling passed? There
may well be a plausible rationale for the Parliamentarian’s pattern of rulings, and
we do not mean to cast doubt on this or any previous Parliamentarian’s good
faith. But as a general matter, freedom from any explanatory requirement makes
it all the easier to engage in arbitrary and biased decisionmaking. This is no less
true for the Senate Parliamentarian than for anyone else.
To their credit, the staffs of Senators Sanders and Hatch have made the Byrd
rule’s operation somewhat more transparent by releasing certain details to the
public. In the case of Senator Sanders’s staff, that transparency came through a
series of press releases following Byrd baths throughout 2017.177 In the case of
Senator Hatch’s staff, it took the form of a single document explaining the

175. See Erin Mershon, Presiding Loses Its Prestige in the Senate, ROLL CALL (Aug. 1, 2011),
http://www.rollcall.com/news/presiding-loses-its-prestige-in-senate-207942-1.html
[https://perma.cc/JE84-BEF7].
176. See TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT (H.R.) CHANGES MADE TO THE COMMITTEE-REPORTED BILL
DURING FLOOR CONSIDERATION, supra note 123, at 2.
177. See generally Ranking Member Bernie Sanders, U.S. S. COMM. ON THE BUDGET,
http://www.budget.senate.gov/ranking-member/newsroom [https://perma.cc/N8BV-A6VS] (last visited
Mar. 1, 2018).
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rationales for various amendments to the tax bill in early December.178 In neither
case did the release articulate the reason why any provision was found to be in
violation of the Byrd rule. Still, drips and drabs of information are better than no
information at all.
To be sure, this article’s focus on the Parliamentarian’s Byrd rule
determinations may reflect the authors’ own idiosyncratic interests. Most voters
are unaware of the rule and unconcerned about what happens in Byrd baths
behind closed doors. That said, transparency can serve to discipline
decisionmaking even if it makes little difference at the ballot box. It can serve to
legitimize a process that now appears ad hoc.
The virtues of transparency do not necessarily lead to the prescription that
Byrd baths should occur in full public view. But important process values would
be vindicated if the results and rationales of Byrd baths were revealed. One way
for this to happen would be for Budget Committee staffers from both parties to
publish short summaries of these sessions afterwards, with some explanation as
to how each decision was reached. The Senate Parliamentarian also could publish
her guidance and rationale after the fact, though this proposal might impose
additional paperwork requirements on an office that is already thinly staffed.
VI
CONCLUSION
Reflection on the Byrd rule’s first three dozen years leads to a richer
understanding of the provision’s importance as well as a heightened awareness
of its potential unintended effects. The Byrd rule’s namesake envisioned it as a
bulwark that would protect the Senate’s deliberative character and
supermajoritarian norms from the threat posed by the fast-track budget
reconciliation process. In practice, the Byrd rule has proven to be much less than
that and much more. It has proven to be less than that insofar as it has failed to
prevent either party from using the reconciliation process to implement
controversial domestic policies with tangential budgetary impacts. And yet the
fact that so many significant bills become law through the reconciliation route
means that the Byrd rule ripples widely across the United States Code. Nowhere
is that more true than in tax law, where budget reconciliation has become the
primary pathway for legislative action and where the Byrd rule has proven to be
a sometimes-binding constraint on the contents of statutes.
This evaluation of the Byrd rule’s role in recent reconciliation efforts leads
toward a set of pessimistic conclusions regarding its practical effects. The Byrd
rule has not prevented Congress from passing legislation that increases the longterm deficit, and in some respects it may have served to undermine fiscal
discipline. It has not nudged the parties toward a more consensus-oriented
approach to lawmaking—and in some instances, it has become a weapon of

178. See TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT (H.R.) CHANGES MADE TO THE COMMITTEE-REPORTED BILL
DURING FLOOR CONSIDERATION, supra note 123, at 2.
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partisan warfare. Its substantive effects have been scattershot: important
provisions have been excised from reconciliation bills as a result of the Byrd rule,
but the Parliamentarian’s pattern of Byrd rule decisions sometimes reveals no
discernable rhyme or reason. This observation is not intended as an indictment
of any individual Parliamentarian as much as it is a criticism of the opaque
process through which Byrd rule determinations are made.
Nonetheless, the problems with the Byrd rule do not lead ineluctably to an
argument for the rule’s repeal. Some sort of subject-matter limit on budget
reconciliation is probably necessary in the present environment if the Senate is
to retain its supermajoritarian character. (Whether the Senate’s
supermajoritarian character is itself normatively desirable presents a more
difficult question.) True, the budget reconciliation process existed for a decade
before the Byrd rule’s emergence without swallowing the legislative filibuster
entirely, but the Senate was a very different—and much less partisan—body in
the late 1970s and early 1980s than it is today. The Byrd rule turns out to be a
rather elastic limit on budget reconciliation, but it is likely to be an enduring
feature of Senate procedure as long as the legislative filibuster persists. Given the
surprising durability of the Senate’s supermajoritarian norms, the Byrd rule likely
will continue to play an influential—if often erratic—role in the tax legislative
process in the coming years.
The Byrd rule’s ongoing importance underscores the need for reform. The
application of the Byrd rule to scuttle balanced budget enforcement procedures
and revenue-dependent trigger mechanisms is a perverse result that is not
obviously mandated by the rule’s text. The use of the Byrd rule to preserve
provisions that confer large benefits on small groups—such as the tax exemption
for professional sports leagues—seems like a dubious application of the “merely
incidental” proviso that, again, the text does not demand. Perhaps there is a
coherent theory of the Byrd rule that the Parliamentarian is invoking in these
cases that the authors of this article have failed to discern. But if so, that is a
further argument for greater openness on the part of the Parliamentarian and
Senate staff. Transparency could help to legitimize a process that now seems both
capricious and consequential. If the Byrd rule continues to shape tax legislation,
as it likely will, then it ought to do so outside of the shadows.

